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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a story, probably apocryphal, that, at a 1970s conference
discussing the great potential and even greater problems of some eco-
nomically developing countries, a rather cynical American economist is
supposed to have remarked that "Brazil is the country of the fu-
ture-and always will be." Some commentators believe that much the
same could be said about the certification process, but with greater
accuracy.
Certification has beguiled and to some extent disappointed two
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generations of legal scholars.' Intended to resolve problems that arise
when a court of one jurisdiction must apply the law of another jurisdic-
tion, certification is the process by which the first court may inquire of
a court in the jurisdiction whose law is at issue for help in determining
what the law is.2 The certification process is inherently attractive be-
cause it eliminates the need for a court either to guess at another juris-
diction's uncertain law or to refrain altogether from trying to apply that
law.
The difficulty that certification can ease typically arises in one of
two situations. The first situation occurs when a federal court, for
whatever reason, must identify and apply the substantive law of a state.
Federal courts hearing diversity cases 3 are the most likely to inquire
into state law, but the problem can also arise when a federal court's
subject-matter jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal ques-
tion.4 The second situation occurs when a state court's own conflict-of-
laws rules direct it to apply the law of another state.5
1. Among the most influential of the earlier articles on certification is Vestal, The Certified
Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. REv. 629 (1951). For a more recent discussion of certification see, for
example, Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1979). The potential of certification has attracted support beyond the academic
side of the bar. Chief Justice Rehnquist recently described certification as "a promising tool for
obviating some of the great difficulties which result when a federal court attempts to interpret a
state statute which has never been interpreted by the highest court of the state." W. Rehnquist,
Remarks at the Meeting of the National Conference of Chief Justices, Williamsburg, Va., 15 (Jan.
27, 1988). Chief Judge William Holloway of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, calling certification "a very important device that has not been appreciated fully," recently
emphasized that the Oklahoma Supreme Court "deems it an honor to be asked to respond to a
question." Interview with Chief Judge William J. Holloway, Jr., THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1987, at 1,
8.
2. See, e.g., In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., 807 F.2d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir. 1986) (indicating that
Indiana appellate procedure "allows certification of a question of Indiana law to the Indiana Su-
preme Court when the question is determinative of the case and there is no clear controlling Indi-
ana Supreme Court precedent"). Nearly half of the states provide a procedure whereby their trial
courts may certify questions to their own high courts. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 632-33. States
with such an intrajurisdictional certification procedure include: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. at
632 nn.12-29 (citing various state statutes allowing certification).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (providing for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits be-
tween citizens of different states).
4. Id. § 1331 (providing for federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits involving a federal
question). In Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), for example, the dispute before
the federal court involved questions of federal tax law, but resolution of those questions required a
determination of how certain property would be apportioned under state law. Federal courts using
their pendent jurisdiction to hear state questions might also have need for a procedure by which
they can obtain an authoritative determination of state law from a state court. For further discus-
sion of this matter, see infra note 96.
5. When litigation in state court involves parties from different states or transactions or
events with interstate characteristics, the forum may choose to apply the law of another state.
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The first situation, involving the use of certification by federal
courts, has spawned a limited amount of case law. The second situation
has produced neither reported opinions nor scholarly comment. In fact,
the almost total dearth of scholarly discussion of certification in the
state-to-state choice-of-law context demonstrates best of all the anom-
aly of certification that has consigned the process, like Brazil, to a fu-
ture of eternally unrealized potential. On the one hand, certification has
substantial promise. On the other hand, certification may remain just
that-a doctrine whose promise is still mostly unfulfilled.
A purpose of this Article is to redress the scholarly deficiency in
discussion of certification in the state-to-state choice-of-law situation.
Part II of this Article traces the origin of certification in the aftermath
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,6 which altered so much the federal
courts' approach to nonfederal questions. Parts III and IV of this Arti-
cle explore the reasons offered for the relatively infrequent use of certi-
fication in both Erie and conventional state-to-state choice-of-law cases,
with special attention to both the problems and the unique, mostly un-
noticed promise of the use of certification in state-to-state choice-of-law
litigation. The Article concludes with a discussion of the results and
meaning of one of the few empirical studies of the use of certification in
the United States.'
II. BACKGROUND: THE LEGACY OF ERIE
Certification is a byproduct of the revolution that Erie introduced
to federal civil procedure. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson,8 in which the
Supreme Court declared that federal courts sitting in diversity cases
were free to fashion federal common law if no state statute governed
the issue.' In place of Swift, Erie directed that federal diversity cases
would be controlled by the same substantive law that would apply if the
case were being heard in state court.10
Determining when and how a court should apply such law is at the heart of the field called "Con-
flict of Laws."
Not infrequently a federal court sitting in diversity must first determine the conflict-of-laws
rules of the state in which the court sits, and then determine the substantive law of another state,
to which the conflict-of-laws rules have directed the court. This process was mandated in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). In either or both of those inquiries,
the federal court may find it difficult to determine state law. These problems prompted Judge
Henry Friendly to remark that "[o]ur principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to
determine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. See infra notes 140-77 and accompanying text (discussing empirical study).
8. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
9. Id.
10. 304 U.S. at 78-80.
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In one sense, the Erie revolution is complete: Swift is no more. But
Erie also created a welter of problems, among them the question of how
a federal court could determine with confidence the substantive law of a
state when that law was itself uncertain. State trial courts faced with
the same uncertainty have two distinct advantages over their federal
brethren: first, an appeal to higher state tribunals might well correct
trial judges' errors; and, second, the state trial judges themselves typi-
cally have more experience in state law than federal judges do. Those
comparative federal disadvantages are only highlighted when federal
decisions interpreting state law are rebutted by subsequent state court
decisions.11
A. The Costly Benefits of Abstention
To combat such problems inherent in federal courts' application of
state law, the courts have fashioned a technique for ascertaining the
applicable state law. Abstention is the practice whereby a federal court
will "stay its hand until the courts of the State. .. have declared the
law of the State. . .which is applicable to and controlling in the dispo-
sition of [the] appeals." 2 Once a federal court abstains from deciding a
case on an issue of state law, the litigants must proceed to the state
courts for disposition on that issue.'" Usually, litigants bring a declara-
tory judgment action in the appropriate state court and proceed to the
final appellate court through the tiers of the state judiciary. 4
The abstention procedure has long been criticized for several rea-
sons, including the financial costs and delay that abstention may im-
11. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusel, 131 So. 2d 730, 733-34 (Fla. 1961) (stating that
the federal holding in Pogue v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957), was not a
correct interpretation of state law); see also Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434
N.E.2d 1319 (1982) (refusing to follow the interpretation of New York tort law advanced by the
Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978)); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960) (refusing to follow National Sur. Corp. v. Bellah,
245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957)).
12. United Serv. Lifg Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964. The Supreme Court has endorsed the use of abstention in a variety of
circumstances. See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (abstention may be
appropriate when continued federal proceedings would only parallel existing state litigation); Rail-
road Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention appropriate so that state court could
decide state issues, potentially obviating need to decide federal constitutional issue).
13. Some jurists are uneasy about abstention in diversity cases because abstention directs
litigants away from their court of choice, despite the litigant's proper invocation of jurisdiction.
See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (indicating that
"[t]he situations where a federal court might await decision in a state court or even remand the
parties to it should be the exception not the rule").
14. Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18
UCLA L. REv. 888, 890-91 n.22 (1971).
1988]
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pose.15 Essentially, abstention requires parties who have already filed
an action in federal court, and expended time and money to get a judg-
ment there, to forego their investment and retire to a state trial court.
Moreover, the state trial court will likely be no more than an interim
stop on the way to a state appellate court's final disposition of the legal
question that caused the federal court to abstain. Abstention's conse-
quence for the swift, efficient application of justice is obvious. Thus did
Justice William 0. Douglas "desire to give renewed protest to our prac-
tice of making litigants travel a long, expensive road in order to obtain
justice.""6 Douglas might have added that abstention imposes duplica-
tive litigation on federal and state trial courts and also imposes a tax on
the public treasury.
At the same time, abstention carries with it a risk that federal
courts will abdicate their responsibility to decide issues of law before
them. As one federal judge has pointed out, the diversity statute17 cre-
ated a duty as well as authority for federal courts to decide diversity
cases. 8 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has held that the circum-
stances in which a federal court may abstain from deciding diversity
cases are few and narrow: a federal court may abdicate its duty to de-
cide questions of state law whenever necessary to render a judgment
only when "some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding
the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred. . . would in exceptional cases
warrant its non-exercise."19
A federal court's obligation to remain open to most jurisdictionally
appropriate diversity suits thus coincides with considerations of econ-
omy and prompt dispensation of justice, and suggests that abstention is
a practice that should rarely be employed.20
B. The Promise of Certification
In many respects, certification is an outgrowth of the abstention
era.21 The main argument in favor of abstention-that only state courts
15. The New York Law Revision Commission remarked that "[t]he expense and delay caused
by proceeding through the lower state courts up to the highest state court to obtain a definitive
resolution of state law can make abstention an onerous burden on litigants." Memorandum of the
New York Law Revision Commission Relating to Certification of Questions of Law to the Court of
Appeals, at 6 (1984).
16. Clay, 363 U.S. at 227 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
18. See Delaney, 328 F.2d at 485 (Tuttle, C.J., dissenting).
19. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) (Stone, C.J.).
20. Id. (indicating that abstention should be employed only in "exceptional circumstances");
accord Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal courts'
obligation to hear cases properly invoking federal jurisdiction should not be lightly cast aside).
21. Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979) (certification
largely a response to problems resulting from abstention, which itself was primarily a product of
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and legislatures have authority to declare state law and pol-
icy-supports with equal force the certification process. But courts usu-
ally perceive certification as a better means of achieving the end for
which abstention was fashioned. In Bellotti v. Baird,22 for example, the
Supreme Court stated that, "[a]lthough we do not mean to intimate
that abstention would be improper in this case were certification not
possible, the availability of certification greatly simplifies the analy-
sis. ''23 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in his dissenting opinion
in Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad v. Williams,24 certification is "a mode of
disposing of cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious
way."'25 Furthermore, state courts have been generally receptive to the
certification process. 26
As a means of redressing many of the difficulties raised by absten-
tion, certification has itself become a subject of controversy. Proponents
of the procedure claim that certification respects federal-state auton-
omy, while relieving litigants of some of the burdens imposed under the
abstention doctrine. For every advocate, however, certification seems
Erie).
22. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
23. Id. at 151; see also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 662-63 n.16 (1978) (no need to defer
to federal district court's finding on state law when there exists an efficient means of certifying
question to state high court).
24. 214 U.S. 492 (1909).
25. Id. at 495-96 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For additional remarks favorable to the certifica-
tion process, see Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), and Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 249 F.2d 847,
854 (7th Cir. 1957) (Finnegan, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668 (Me. 1974) (noting that certification spares liti-
gants delay caused by abstention). In addition, as the Supreme Court of Maine has suggested,
"certification is likely to provide the litigants with a decision of the highest court of the State, as a
definitive determination of the state law issues, almost as speedily as they would have the federal
Court's [non-definitive] decision of them (if the federal Court does not abstain)." Id. at 683. But
see Holden v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1981) (state certification statute unconsti-
tutional because Utah constitution's grant of "appellate jurisdiction" does not include power to
answer certified questions).
27. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375-76 (Fla. 1978). See generally Com-
ment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: Perfection of Means and Confusion of
Goals, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 868 n.85 (1964) (noting that certification is obviously less costly to liti-
gants than abstention because it skips the trial and intermediate appellate stages of state litigation
and permits quicker resolution by a state's highest court); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification:
Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 350 (1963)
(indicating that certification "not only achieves the objectives of abstention-to prevent federal
invasion of the state law-making function and to avoid needless federal-state friction-but also
represents a more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism"). In White v. Edgar the Su-
preme Court of Maine noted that
[tihe extra costs to the litigants in money, energy, time and general inconvenience are likely
to be far less in the certification process than in the prosecution of an independent state
action to be carried through the trial and appellate levels of the state judicial system (the
result produced by federal abstention).
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also to evoke a critic. Though it may be an improvement on abstention,
certification's promise remains mostly a promise for the future, not per-
formance in the present.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CERTIFICATION
Some of the objections raised to certification share a great deal in
common with the concerns originally addressed to abstention.28 Others,
such as the apprehension that certification may require state supreme
courts to render advisory opinions,2 9 are unique to certification. Con-
cerns unique to certification are better understood by first clarifying the
typical procedure by which a court may certify a question.
The New York City Bar Association's Committee on Federal
Courts recently reported"0 that many states permitting certification
have followed the model of the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act (hereinafter U.L.A. or the Act), proposed by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Bar Association. The Act provides that certification may be obtained
either on motion of a party or by order of the court sua sponte. 1 Once
a question is certified, parties usually brief and argue the case before
the state supreme court in a manner consistent with normal procedures
for hearing appeals to that court.3 2 An important difference between
appellate procedure and certification is that the state supreme court
hearing a typical appeal from its own inferior courts usually has the full
record of the case as it proceeded through those lower courts, while the
court hearing a certified case often has before it only whatever record or
statement of facts the certifying court deems necessary for the state
supreme court to decide the certified question.3
320 A.2d at 683. The Maine Supreme Court also observed that it was and would "continue [to be]
a strong policy of this Court. . .to implement the certification process." Id. at 676; cf. Tri-Conti-
nental Leasing Corp. v. Cicerchia, 664 F. Supp. 635, 638 n.3 (D. Mass. 1987) (regretting absence of
certification in New Jersey, "for it cannot be that the values and interests of the citizens of New
Jersey are best served by having a federal court in Massachusetts decide these unsettled questions
of New Jersey law in the first instance").
28. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
30. Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis of State Laws Providing for Certification by
Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues of Law, 42 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 101, 103 (1987)
[hereinafter Analysis of State Laws].
31. UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 2, 12 U.LA 53 (1967) [hereinafter
U.L.A.] provides that "this [Act] [Rule] may be invoked by an order of any of the courts referred to
in section 1 upon the court's own motion or upon the motion of any party to the cause." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently exercised its power to certify sua
sponte. Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 837 F.2d 299, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1988).
32. U.L.A. § 6, 12 U.L.A., supra note 31, at 54, provides that briefs filed and arguments heard
are to be governed by local rules or statutes.
33. U.L.A. § 3, 12 U.LA, supra note 31, at 53, reads: "A certification order shall set forth: (1)
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Questions decided on certification also differ from cases heard on
appeal (including cases in which federal courts sitting in diversity have
abstained) in the way the case is handled after the highest state court
issues a holding. If that court remands a typical case on appeal to a
lower state court for proceedings consistent with the higher court's de-
cision, the case remains in the state court system and is thus theoreti-
cally still within the control of the state high court. When a certified
question is answered and returned to the certifying court, however, the
state high court's influence over the case is effectively ended.
Thus, the certifying mechanism creates potentially anomalous situ-
ations that have themselves become occasion to question the appropri-
ateness of certification processes.
A. Certification Seeks Advisory Opinions to Abstract Questions of
Law
1. Advisory Opinions
Probably the most damaging argument against the use of certifica-
tion is the claim that certified questions seek advisory opinions from
the state courts. In responding to a certified question, one commentator
has argued that the state court may be rendering an advisory opinion
because the state court "is not necessarily resolving the dispute brought
in the federal court, and arguably, the parties are not bound by the
state court resolution of the issue(s) certified since the parties return to
the federal court to litigate the cause there pending." 4
Some courts possess both the power and the willingness to issue
advisory opinions, but many state constitutions and judicial enabling
acts prohibit the rendering of such opinions.35 Section 1 of the U.L.A.
attempts to address the advisory opinion issue with the following lan-
the questions of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions
certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose."
Although this requirement suggests that the proceedings must be substantially advanced
before certification is possible, most questions certified before trial courts reach a judgment will
typically be certified on an incomplete record. Therefore, the record on a certified question will
often be substantially less complete than the record of a case being heard on appeal. Because the
answering court has no power to conduct additional factfinding, it can do little directly to expand
the record. But see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963) (answering court
can remand certified question for more facts).
34. Comment, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification and Full Faith and Credit in Federal
Courts: To Certify or Not to Certify, Is that a Question?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 167, 172 (1970).
35. See, e.g., In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 471 A.2d 313 (1984); United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965); Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 445 P.2d
1012 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting) (arguing that answering certified questions is giving advisory
opinions, which is unconstitutional). For a detailed discussion of state courts' outlook on advisory
opinions, see Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717 (1969).
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:411
guage: "The [supreme court] may answer questions of law certified to it
[if they involve issues] of law of this state which may be determinative
of the cause then pending in the certifying court."3 6 Seven states have
modified the U.L.A.'s language to require that the issue of law must
actually be dispositive of the case," but even among those jurisdictions
doubt exists that the language employed has obviated the question
entirely.38
When courts acknowledge that a response to a certified question
resembles an advisory opinion, they have taken different approaches to
avoid crossing the advisory opinion line. For example, Florida has
avoided the advisory opinion argument against certification by declar-
ing advisory opinions to be permissible under the state constitution. 9
Similarly, although the Supreme Court of Washington did not believe
certified answers to be violative of the state prohibition against advisory
opinions, the court followed Florida's lead and declared advisory opin-
ions to be valid pronouncements of state law.40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the
original federal advocate of the certification procedure; thus its develop-
ing view of the advisory opinion argument may shed some light on the
certification process from the federal point of view. In Sun Insurance
36. U.L.A. § 1, 12 U.LA, supra note 31, at 52 (emphasis added).
37. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 632 nn.12-29 (citing Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Mexico statutes or rules); see also IDAHO APP. R. 12.1 (providing
that "[t]he question of law certified is a controlling question of law in the pending action in the
U.S. court as to which there is no controlling precedent"); MONT. R. APP. P. 44(a) (employing the
language "controlling question of Montana law as to which there is substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion"); see also Masters Mach. Co. v. Brookfield Athletic Shoe Co., 663 F. Supp. 439,
441 (D. Me. 1987) (denying motion to certify because resolution of the issue would not be "deter-
minative of the cause" and, in addition, a state precedent already existed); cf. Trust for Quinn v.
United States, 823 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1987) (certifying to Louisiana Supreme Court that answer to
a certified question will be determinative of the case).
38. Notwithstanding the statutory requirement that the answer be determinative of the case,
the Florida Supreme Court has answered certified questions when further proceedings apparently
would be necessary in the federal court. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
But cf. Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1980) (Florida Supreme Court refused to answer
certified question from United States Court of Appeals because response would not be determina-
tive of cause).
39. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 739-43 (Fla. 1961).
40. In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (1968). The court also reasoned that the need
to answer certified questions of significant public importance justified rendering an advisory opin-
ion. Id. at 616-17, 446 P.2d at 358. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a certified question
arising from a real case or controversy does not violate prohibitions on advisory opinions. Spencer
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980); see also Delaney, 328 F.2d at
489 (noting that certified question was vital and important to contesting litigants).
Commentators also are inclined to call for state courts to answer questions certified to them
by a federal court, irrespective of the certified answer's potentially advisory nature. See, e.g., Roth,
supra note 1, at 21.
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Office, Ltd. v. Clay41 the Fifth Circuit voiced skepticism about the au-
thoritative nature of certified answers. The court stated that such an-
swers might be "merely advisory and entitled, like dicta, to be given
persuasive but not binding effect. '4 2 The court's feeling toward the
weight given to certified answers, however, changed within five years of
Clay. In Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.43 the Fifth Circuit pro-
claimed certified answers to be clear, positive, and final because certi-
fied answers state "what the law actually is on the precise point
presented. '44
If a prohibition against advisory opinions applies to certified ques-
tions, the prohibition binds the state court answering the question, not
the certifying court, which undoubtedly has a real case or controversy
before it. Some state courts, therefore, have escaped the advisory opin-
ion prohibition by finding a real case or controversy in litigation before
the certifying court. Thus, in Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insur-
ance Co.45 the Kansas Supreme Court examined the statutory language
of the Kansas certification procedure in light of the litigation before the
certifying court. The Spencer court concluded that the certified ques-
tion "arises from an actual case and controversy and although
presented as a question of law, it neither violates the case or contro-
versy requirement nor the separation of powers doctrine on advisory
opinions. '48  Similarly, in Wolner v. Mahaska Industries, Inc.47 the
41. 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963).
42. Id. at 509.
43. 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
44. Id. at 657. The concurring opinion in Hopkins rejected the advisory opinion argument
even more strongly. The concurring judge wrote:
This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and the power to affirm,
reverse, or modify the judgment brought before it for review on appeal. The Supreme Court
of Florida had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. It had no power to make
or enforce any adjudication of the controversy. The cause was not and could not have been
adjudicated by it. It entered no judgment and made no decision. It did not have before it the
parties or the subject matter, except as the parties voluntarily submitted argument.... . The
action of the [state] court was not an adjudication, since only the Federal courts could enter
and enforce judgment. Hence, the action by the [state] court was not an exercise of a judicial
power. It was, so it seems to me, only the expression of an opinion on the law of [the state] by
judges well qualified to give an opinion.
Id. at 658 (Jones, J., concurring).
45. 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980).
46. Id. at 915, 611 P.2d at 151. For a subsequent Kansas case ruling on similar grounds, see
Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983). In Kline the Kansas
Supreme Court decided issues of Kansas law certified by the federal district court in Kansas. The
state issue involved the possible liability of a corporation for punitive damages awarded for an
employee's tortious action. In holding that Kansas law did not make a corporation liable for such
damages, the Kansas Supreme Court specifically noted that the case at bar "arises from an actual
controversy between the parties." Id. at 988, 666 P.2d at 712.
47. 325 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1983).
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Minnesota Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that an-
swers to certified questions are advisory opinions. Agreeing with the
Fifth Circuit's rationale in Hopkins,5 the Minnesota court held that
certified answers represent "a pronouncement of law with the same ef-
fect as our pronouncements of law in cases arising in the courts of this
state.
'49
Occasionally, the language of a state's certification statute requir-
ing that questions certified be "determinative" of the issue, if not the
case, has provided state courts with an effective rebuttal to the advisory
opinion argument.50 In particular, the Maine Supreme Court has re-
fused to answer certified questions unless the case is in such a posture
that the state court's decision on the applicable Maine law will-in
truth and in fact-be determinative of the cause of action.5 1 The Loui-
siana Supreme Court has taken yet another tack: on the one hand, the
court has acknowledged that certified questions seek an advisory opin-
ion; on the other hand, however, the court has recognized that provid-
ing answers to such questions is a matter of courtesy to, and respect for,
the United States Supreme Court. 2
Most state high courts thus have sought and found one way or an-
other around the advisory opinion objection to certification. Some of
the answers, such as Louisiana's, speak more to practical considerations
than to rigorous judicial analysis. In fact, the sheer variety of answers to
the advisory opinion issue suggests that no single, entirely satisfactory
answer to that objection exists. The clear preponderance of opinion that
answers to the objection can be found, however, suggests that concerns
about rendering advisory opinions will not be a significant barrier to
certification in the future.
2. Abstractness
Some courts and opponents of certification argue that certified
questions are too abstract for judicial resolution. Many of the same
48. 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. Wolner, 325 N.W.2d at 41.
50. See, e.g., White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668 (Me. 1974); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me.
1966); In re Certified Question, 549 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1976) (Wyoming court would not answer
certified questions unless the federal court followed the state decision precisely); see also supra
notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
51. White, 320 A.2d at 677 (if answering question of state law in one of several possible ways
will produce resolution of federal litigation, the question of state law is sufficiently determinative
of the case so as to satisfy state certification statute).
52. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
53. Id. at 927, 132 So. 2d at 850 (noting abstractness of the issue, but answering the question
out of respect for the certifying court). But see United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d
855, 862-63 (Tex. 1965) (rejecting approach of Leiter and holding Texas Supreme Court unable to
render opinion, even when request for it came in the form of a declaratory judgment action).
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arguments noted in the discussion concerning advisory opinions also ap-
ply to discussions of the abstract nature of certified questions. But
there is one significant difference: if the advisory opinion objection has
vitality, the only responses would be either to abandon certification al-
together or to modify the applicable laws or constitutional provisions
that prohibit advisory opinions. The first response may well be an unac-
ceptable alternative, and the second might be an arduous task that
would run into opposition grounded in principled concerns about advi-
sory opinions. By contrast, if the problem is one of abstractness in the
manner in which a certified question is framed, it is likely that rather
obvious corrections in the way a question is certified may adequately
deal with the problem.
Proponents of certification have argued that certified questions are
not abstract when they are accompanied by a statement of facts, 54 espe-
cially when the factual statement is drafted by both parties involved. 5
As noted by one commentator, a state court's determination of the ap-
plicable law of the state "should produce no more abstract questions
than cases appealed from lower state courts, and no one would maintain
that ordinary appeals from inferior courts present abstract questions of
law.",56
State courts, however, sometimes express concern about the ab-
stractness of the questions certified. In Sydenstricker v. Unipunch
Products, Inc.,57 for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals answered the questions certified, but noted that the abstract na-
ture of the answer was due to the conclusory nature of the facts
presented.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit estab-
54. Lillich & Mundy, supra note 14, at 901-02.
55. Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida Su-
preme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 431 (1962); see
also Lillich & Mundy, supra note 14, at 901-02 (suggesting that "[ilt seems apparent, in light of
the experience of states using the procedure, that abstractness presents at most a drafting
problem").
56. Lillich & Mundy, supra note 14, at 902.
57. 169 W. Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (1982).
58. Id. at 444-45, 288 S.E.2d at 514; cf. Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482,
485 (Fla. 1970) (Florida Supreme Court added a fact from record not included in the certificate of
the appellate judge).
The U.L.A. makes a statement of facts mandatory "A certification order shall set forth: (1)
the questions of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions
certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose." U.L.A. § 3,
12 U.LA., supra note 31, at 53. Professor Allan Vestal stated that this language is to ensure that
the certifying court gives a complete background of the case as it developed to the answering court,
in order to reduce the problem of abstractness. A. Vestal, Transcript of Proceedings of Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 32 (Aug. 1, 1967) (available on micro-
fiche, on file with the Authors).
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lished precedent for dealing with this criticism of certification by trans-
mitting the entire record of proceedings in the federal system to the
state court.5 9 A practice of transmitting necessary documents and mate-
rial to the state court ensures that the issues are not abstract, or at
least no more abstract than issues in typical appellate cases. Further-
more, the Fifth Circuit's precedent parallels the technical requirements
enforced by the United States Supreme Court in an analogous situa-
tion. To decide an intrajurisdictional certification question, 0 the Su-
preme Court must find that there is an actual legal issue that is isolated
in a particularized factual setting.6 1
In general, corrections in the way in which a question is certified
may adequately deal with the claim that certified questions are too ab-
stract for judicial resolution. Abstractness itself, therefore, appears to
pose no insuperable barrier to the effective use of certification
procedures.
B. Difficulties in Formulating Certified Questions
1. The Problem
Abstractness is one aspect of a more generalized problem with cer-
tification: the inability of a federal court to fashion questions that will
give the answering court maximum help in reaching an informed deci-
sion. Addressing one certified matter, Justice Roy Vance of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court dryly remarked that
[i]t is almost always helpful in deciding important legal issues to have the issue
clearly stated, to have a record of evidence pertaining to the issue, and to have the
briefs and arguments of counsel presenting all sides of the question. We do not
have that situation here.
62
59. See Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 709 (5th Cir. 1975)
(noting that court sent entire record, court's opinion, briefs of both parties, and counsel's memo-
randum on certification).
60. For a brief discussion of certification within a jurisdiction, see supra note 2.
61. Note, supra note 27, at 352-54.
62. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 672 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky. 1984) (Vance, J., dissenting).
Inadequate framing of the questions and the occasional absence of a proper factual background
characterize many courts' complaints about certified issues. In Flannery v. United States, 297
S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1983), the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals observed that the certifying court presented only one question, but concluded that the
question encompassed two distinct issues requiring separate answers. Id. at 436. In In re Question
Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980), the court complained that,
"[d]ue to the limited record which has been supplied to this court regarding the four cases which
gave rise to this question of state judicial review, it is difficult for this court to give a definitive
answer to the question." Id. at 465, 610 P.2d at 1341; see also Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74
Wash. 2d 679, 689, 445 P.2d 1012, 1017 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting) (issue should not have been
decided by state court because issues were not clearly defined in memorandum); cf. Payton v.
Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 545, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (noting that several issues certified to
the court were factual).
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In all cases involving certification, the state decision relies heavily
on the questions certified to the state court by the federal court. The
language and scope of the questions certified determine, to a large ex-
tent, the interpretation and application of the state law or policy in
question. Acknowledging this fact, the federal court's duty to assist in
the formulation of the questions of law cannot be doubted. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter noted, "[p]utting the wrong questions is not likely to
beget right answers even in law."63
When courts have no standard procedure to classify the questions
of law or the specific issues involved, the very formulation of the ques-
tions may lead to confusion and inconsistency in judgments.6 4 Although
poorly stated legal issues create most of the confusion, facts surround-
ing particular cases may also lead to inconsistent judgments. In Mason
v. Gerin Corp.,65 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that
the statement of facts set out in the federal court's certification memo-
randum and order provided the court with the relevant facts at issue.
The court did state, however, that "it is not clear from the record
before us when the plaintiff's original action was initiated. 's6
As is so often the case with problems relating to certification mat-
ters, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has de-
veloped procedures designed to minimize the problem of, inadequate
formulation of questions. In most cases, the Fifth Circuit requests that
the parties formulate the questions based on an agreed statement of
facts.6 If the parties cannot agree on the statement of facts or the lan-
guage of the questions to be posed to the state court, the Fifth Circuit
formulates them independently of the parties."' In either situation, the
federal court should review the statement of facts to ensure its ade-
quacy and thoroughness.
Dissenting in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), Justice Hugo Black
struck an empathetic note: "Perhaps state courts take no more pleasure than do federal courts in
deciding cases piecemeal on certificates. State courts probably prefer to determine their questions
of law with complete records of cases in which they can enter final judgments before them." Id. at
227 (Black, J., dissenting).
63. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 170 (1946).
64. Stein, Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Renvoi, 17 McGnLL L.J. 581, 582 (1971).
65. 231 Kan. 718, 647 P.2d 1340 (1982).
66. Id. at 719, 647 P.2d at 1341.
67. See supra notes 41-44 & 59 and accompanying text; infra notes 68-69 & 71-72 and ac-
companying text.
68. See, e.g., Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044, 1050 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Cesary v. Second Nat'l Bank of N. Miami, 567 F.2d 283, 284 (5th Cir. 1978)
(stating that the court drafted the statement of facts and the parties formulated the questions of
law); Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660, 664 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (parties required to submit joint
statement of facts).
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2. Allowing Answering Courts to Reformulate Certified Questions
Regardless of the clarity of the record, facts, and issues certified,
the answering court must have the power to reformulate the questions
posed. Although the court should not answer questions unrelated to the
case at hand, the answering court should have the same freedom to ana-
lyze the factual circumstances that it would have if the entire case were
before the court. Indeed, the ability of the answering court to reshape
or add to the issues is necessary to further the goals of certification.
The answering court may be best situated to frame the question for
precedential value and to control the development of its laws. If state
courts take offense at a poorly framed question, they may miss a genu-
ine opportunity to settle state law on a particular point.
70
The Fifth Circuit has specifically approved an answering court's re-
casting of issues. In Martinez v. Rodriquez71 the court stated that the
particular form of the certified question
is not to restrict the [State] Supreme Court's consideration of the problems in-
volved and the issues as the [State] Supreme Court perceives them to be in its
analysis of the record certified in this case. This latitude extends to the [State]
Supreme Court's restatement of the issue or issues and the manner in which the
answers are to be given .... 72
Even without invitation, state courts have often decided to adopt
the course urged by the Fifth Circuit.7 3 The requirement in most state
certification statutes that parties submit briefs and present oral argu-
ments reduces the possibility of erroneously reshaping an issue.7 4 Brief-
ings and arguments that take place are generally limited to the
70. Nevertheless, some courts have refused to recharacterize the issues. See, e.g., Krashes v.
White, 275 Md. 549, 557, 341 A.2d 798, 802 (1975) (refusing to reformulate the questions certified
absent district court approval). At least two other courts have also been reluctant to recast ques-
tions. In re Certified Question from the U.S. District Court, E. D. of Mich., S. Div., 420 Mich. 51,
359 N.W.2d 513 (1984); Jones v. Harris, 460 So. 2d 120 (Miss. 1984). The more common practice,
however, is for the certifying court to invite a recharacterization of the questions certified or for
the answering court to assume authority to alter the issues presented. See infra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text. In some measure such cooperative practices may obviate initial weaknesses in
framing issues and in failing to provide adequate factual backgrounds. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
71. 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968).
72. Id. at 159 n.6; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Caguas Fed. Say. & Loan, 825 F.2d
536, 537 (1st Cir. 1986) (inviting Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to comment on any other ques-
tions of relevant state law in addition to questions certified); see also Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac.
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 709 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. See, e.g., Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1983); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984); see also Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 530 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1976).
74. Section 6 of the U.L.A. provides: "Proceedings in the [Supreme Court] shall be those
provided in [local rules or statutes governing briefs and arguments]." U.L.A. § 6, 12 ULA, supra
note 31, at 54.
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questions of law presented in the certificate. 5
C. Certification Places Too Heavy a Burden on Federal Litigants
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, compared
to abstention, certification provides substantial efficiencies in the reso-
lution of difficult questions of state law. 6 At the same time, however, a
procedure in which a federal trial court or appellate court 7 stays its
own process, certifies a question to a state high court, and then upon
receipt of an answer proceeds with the trial or appeal in the federal
system cannot be said to be devoid of delay. Thus, the Supreme Court
also has noted that certification can impose burdens on litigants, and
considerations of delay and expense would inevitably limit the utility of
the procedure."
State courts also have drawn upon this negative feature of certifica-
75. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 437, 397 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1979) (excluding de-
fendant's arguments that fell outside scope of certificate). But cf. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac.
R.R., 334 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 1983) (court responded to matters raised outside of certificate).
76. In Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), Justice Douglas wrote: "We do not sug-
gest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available,
resort to it is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and
helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 390-91.
77. Certification statutes typically permit federal appellate courts, as well as district courts,
to certify questions. But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby, 672 F. Supp. 956, 958 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1987)
(Texas certification statute allows certification only by appellate court).
U.L.A. § 1, which serves as the model for most certification statutes, enumerated the Supreme
Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, and a United States District
Court, as among those courts that may certify questions. U.L.A. § 1, 12 U.L.A., supra note 31, at
52. In fact, when the issue of which courts might certify was being considered, the consensus was
stronger in favor of vesting such power in federal appellate courts rather than federal trial courts.
See A. Vestal, supra note 58, at 8-9, 18-19. The arguments for limiting certification authority to
appellate courts were, first, that only truly difficult questions of state law would be certified, and,
second, that the certification process would somehow be speeded up. Note, supra note 27, at 361.
As one commentator has remarked:
[L]imiting certification to the courts of appeals removes the risk-inherent in abstention and
involved to a lesser degree should district courts be permitted to certify-that prospective
litigants with state claims might be discouraged from invoking federal question or diversity
jurisdiction because they believed that they could obtain speedier relief in state court.
Id. Any requirement, however, that federal litigants appeal a district court decision before ob-
taining certification of a close state question might only encourage appeals in the federal system
that vesting certification power in a federal district court could possibly avoid.
78. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Last year the Court again raised its sensitivity to
this feature of certification. See City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2514 (1987) (noting that
certification is inappropriate where the question of state law is unclear); accord Rizzuto v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 834 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1987); Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1448 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987) (en
banc). A federal district court recently cited considerations of delay and expense for its refusal to
certify a question unresolved in Virginia but settled by the great weight of authority in other
jurisdictions. West Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wright, 673 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Va. 1987). But
see Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391 (certification "does, of course, in the long run save time, en-
ergy, and resources").
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tion. Two frequently cited state decisions addressing certification have
summed up quite effectively the arguments surrounding the delay and
expense of certification. In White v. Edgar 9 the Maine Supreme Court
took a fairly benign view of the delay issue. The White court viewed
certification as beneficial because it allows a litigant to have both his
federal and state claims in essentially a single federal suit. The court
concluded:
It is likely that the litigant will look upon the federal Court's certification, to the
State Court of last resort . . . as, essentially, an aspect of the underlying federal
Court proceedings; and, to the extent that two courts become involved in fact, the
litigant most probably will consider the costs of such duality (likely in any event to
be minimal) as, on balance, a price worth paying for the enormous benefit of a
reasonably speedy definitive determination of the state law questions.80
Other courts have expressed greater concern about the delays
caused by certification. White contrasts sharply with the dissenting
opinion in a Washington case. In In re Elliott81 the dissenting judge
strongly objected to the delay involved in certification, which he found
inherent in a
procedure whereby at one stage the case comes to a halt in the federal system,
moves over into the state system to await docketing, briefing, hearing, writing, fil-
ing of the opinion and petition for rehearing and then moves back again into the
system of origin to take its place on the judicial conveyor for resumption of pro-
ceedings in the federal system.
82
Even the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, an originator and leader of the
certification process, acknowledged that, in determining appropriate
cases for certification, courts must "take into account [the] practical
limitations of the certification process: significant delay and possible in-
ability to frame the issue so as to produce a helpful response on the
part of the state court."83
Granting that certification has only reduced, not eliminated,
problems of expense and delay characteristic of abstention, the ques-
tion remains what courts should do to minimize the delay associated
with certification. The answer to the question depends heavily on one's
perception of the source of the problem. One commentator, for exam-
ple, has suggested that federal courts take too long to decide if the case
should be certified, quite apart from the work that must be done once a
decision to certify is reached.8' Another commentator has responded to
79. 320 A.2d 668 (Me. 1974).
80. Id. at 683.
81. 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (1968).
82. Id. at 640-41, 446 P.2d at 371 (Hale, J., dissenting).
83. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted),
cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Florida, 429 U.S. 829 (1976).
84. Mattis, supra note 35, at 726.
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this suggestion with a proposal that federal courts employ an attorney
to review and evaluate each state issue, which presumably would expe-
dite the federal decision on certification. 5 Once the attorney deter-
mined whether the issue was controlling and established the relative
certainty of state law on point, the federal court could decide whether
to certify the state issues in the case.8 6
The state courts also may be a source of delay and expense, how-
ever, and proposals have been forthcoming to ease the process of certifi-
cation in the answering courts. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for
example, has tried to attack the "expense" half of the problem by hold-
ing one litigant responsible for the costs of the certification procedure.8 7
That practice does little to reduce delay, however, and indeed only ap-
portions, rather than reduces, expense; thus, holding one litigant re-
sponsible for certification costs has not been a substantial improvement
in certification practices in state courts.88
Speeding the process in the state courts seems more likely to en-
courage the use of certification, but other proposals directly addressing
that point have not achieved general acceptance. Answering courts gen-
erally have been reluctant to accord certified questions preferential
treatment on the docket.8 9 Another idea is to empower the chief justice
of each state high court to appoint a special certification court charged
with reviewing and, when appropriate, answering questions of state law
certified by federal courts.90 This proposal, however, loses its initial ap-
peal on closer inspection. A special certification court's decisions proba-
bly would not be afforded the same precedential power as decisions of a
state high court. Thus, what looks initially to be a means of speeding up
the certification process might in fact add to the problems now attend-
ant upon certification.
Perhaps the best way to approach the significant problems of delay
and corresponding expense in certification is to recognize that they are
85. Roth, supra note 1, at 11.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 A.2d 1009, 1019 (1979) (ordering one
party in action to pay costs of certification); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 281 Md. 207,
216, 378 A.2d 1100, 1104 (1977) (same).
88. Moreover, the Maryland court's approach seems inconsistent with the general practice in
American courts of requiring each litigant to pay his or her own way in the courts. Particularly
when a federal court already has certified a matter as a serious question, it seems inappropriate to
levy costs on one side only. To do so would suggest that the losing side has not only lost on the
question at issue but has also advocated a frivolous legal position-a suggestion at odds with the
original decision to certify.
89. See, e.g., Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 74 Wash. 2d 679, 684, 445 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1968)
(Hale, J., dissenting) (arguing that certified questions should not be afforded preferential treat-
ment on state dockets).
90. Roth, supra note 1, at 11.
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inherent in the process-less severe, to be sure, than the delay and ex-
pense that parties encounter in abstention,91 but a perhaps inevitable
cost of using two distinct judicial systems to achieve good law and just
results. That cost may well suggest that certification should be em-
ployed "sparingly and selectively."'92 It also may be, however, that, hav-
ing adopted certification, which thereby reduces the amount of delay
and expense attendant upon abstention, courts and commentators
should recognize that good adjudication in difficult cases is not likely to
be quick or cheap. This recognition does not mean that efforts to re-
duce costs and delay should end. It does indicate, however, that the
long-range benefits of certification-consistency in the law and finality
of state pronouncements that makes it unnecessary for future parties to
litigate the same issue-will often outweigh the inconveniences imposed
on the litigants involved in a particular case.9
It is probably fair to conclude, therefore, that certification has
achieved a sort of guarded approval as a means of resolving difficult
questions that arise from the relationship between federal and state
courts. The approval, though, is qualified by an assumption that the
process has imposed its own costs on both litigants and courts.
This guarded approval of the certification process rests primarily
on perceptions of the theoretical merits and disadvantages of certifica-
tion, buttressed for the most part only by judges' and commentators'
episodic experiences with particular certification opinions. Moreover,
these perceptions leave two questions still unaddressed. The first is
whether certification has significant unused potential in resolving ques-
tions that arise between the courts of different states. The second is
whether an empirical study of certification can validate either the con-
tending praise or criticism of the process. The following sections of this
Article address those questions in order.
91. Lillich & Mundy, supra note 14, at 909 (suggesting that, "[e]ven if the certified question
were placed at the end of the docket, the parties still would have saved the time and expense of
proceeding through the lower state courts").
92. Analysis of State Laws, supra note 30, at 102.
93. One judge has remarked:
[A]bout the only virtue an immediate decision has is that it is done. It is done now and delay
is avoided. Delay, to be sure, is a thing we all strive to avoid and overcome. But what else is
served? Is there any virtue in decision now simply for the sake of decision if-and that if is a
very-big one-the public importance of the question is certain soon to drive other litigants to
the [state c]ourts where the outcome may well be quite different?
Brown, Certification-Federalism in Action, 7 CumB. L. REv. 455, 465 (1977) (quoting W.S. Ranch
Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1967) (Brown, C.J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part), rev'd, 391 U.S. 593 (1968)).
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IV. CERTIFICATION BETWEEN STATE COURTS
A. The Unused Tool
As is suggested by this Article's exclusive reliance on cases in which
federal courts certified questions, certification is not employed by state
courts obligated to apply the law of another state.9 The absence of
opinions addressing certification from one state to another is compre-
hensible, because most legislatures that have enacted certification stat-
utes have excised the language of the U.L.A. that permits courts of
other states to certify questions. 5 Even in the jurisdictions that will
hear certified questions from another state, however, there are no pub-
lished opinions indicating that any use has been made of the
opportunity.
Explanations for the reluctance of state courts to use certification
when it is available are necessarily matters of speculation, for a corol-
lary of non-use has been an absence of justification for non-use. Even
so, some possible explanations exist. First is the possibility that many
state courts faced with the need to apply the law of another state, and
uncertain of what that law is, are simply unaware that certification stat-
utes might profitably be employed. Given the relatively small number
of states that offer the process to sister-state courts, state courts' igno-
rance about certification is understandable.
A second possibility is that state courts feel less need to certify
questions because they perceive themselves as having greater expertise
in another state's law than a federal court is likely to have. State courts,
after all, routinely deal in matters of state law, and so are likely to
know more about state law generally than would federal courts, in
which federal questions predominate on the docket."6 Such familiarity
94. A search of state opinions reported from 1978 to 1987 disclosed no cases in which a ques-
tion of law bad been certified from a court of one state to a court of another state.
95. Twelve jurisdictions allow their courts both to answer certified questions from courts of
another state and to certify questions to courts of another state. See IowA R. APP. P. 451-61; IOWA
CODE §§ 684A.1 to 684A.11 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201 to -3212 (1983); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37;
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1984); MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 1:03; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 480.061 (West. Supp. 1988); N.D. R APP. P. 47; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601 to 1612
(West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.200 to .255 (Butterworth Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE
§§ 51-lA-11 to -12 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 821.01 to .12 (West Supp. 1987); P.R. Sup. CT. R. 24-
27; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 4 app. I-A (1978).
Several other jurisdictions allow their high courts to answer questions from courts of another
state, but apparently do not allow their courts to certify questions to courts of another state. See,
e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18 (employing the language "a court of the United States," which would pre-
sumably include courts of other states); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 797.2 (employing the language "a federal
court or state appellate court").
96. Surveys have regularly indicated that somewhat less than one-quarter of the cases on a
typical federal docket are based on diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3601 n.55 (1984) (22.3% of cases filed in fed-
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might increase a state court's confidence in its ability to divine the law
of another state without resorting to certification.
The second possibility is plausible, but probably not correct. For a
state court to feel as if it were an expert in another state's law, the
court would have to traverse a phenomenon of state-to-state choice-of-
law problems whose existence has long been noted by choice-of-law
commentators. That phenomenon is "forum bias"-the predisposition
of courts, when faced with choice-of-law problems, toward the law of
their own state. As this Article argues, 7 the existence of forum bias
strongly, and perhaps necessarily, suggests that courts apply their own
law in part because they feel unease when grappling with unfamiliar
law from another state. A state court's unease in the face of applying
foreign law is necessarily inconsistent with an assertion that state
courts ignore certification because of their confident sense of expertise
in state law generally.
A third possibility is that some state courts are uncertain whether
the power to certify a question to the court of another state exists at
all-even when the answering state has a certification statute. In the
federal system, the Supreme Court has indicated that, when a certifica-
tion procedure has been provided by a state, federal courts are free to
use certification at their discretion."' By contrast, most state courts are
circumscribed by state constitutions, and they do not have the inherent
powers that the Supreme Court has identified in the federal courts.
Finally, state-to-state certification may become problematic when a
jurisdiction employs the renvoi doctrine.99 There is at least a three-
tiered inquiry to determine whether certification is appropriate in a
state-to-state situation. First, the choice-of-law rule of the certifying
state, as applied, must refer that state court to the law of another
eral district court during 1983 were diversity cases). The jurisdictional basis of a case, however,
may not be an accurate indicator of the percentage of cases in which federal judges must address
questions of state law. In matters involving a federal district court's pendent jurisdiction, for ex-
ample, the federal court decides state claims, notwithstanding an absence of diversity jurisdiction.
Moreover, many federal questions either incorporate relevant portions of state law or require refer-
ence to state law before the court may address the federal question. An example of a federal ques-
tion that requires reference to state law might be a suit over a federal income tax question that
requires a determination of whether the taxpayer was legally married. Although federal judges
probably have more experience in state law than their diversity dockets standing alone would indi-
cate, state court judges remain more experienced in issues of state law.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 134-39 (discussing unfamiliarity with foreign law as a
motive for forum bias).
98. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974).
99. Renvoi deals with whether, when one state is referred by its choice-of-law rule to the law
of another state, the referral is to the internal law of the other state only or to the whole law of the
state, including its choice-of-law rule. For an additional discussion of renvoi, see Comment, Renvoi
and the Modern Approaches to Choice-of-Law, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 1049 (1981).
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state. 100 Second, certification is proper only if the other state court's
answer may be determinative of the cause and if the other state's law is
unclear. 01 Third, the certifying state's choice-of-law rule, as applied,
may refer the certifying court to a state employing the renvoi doctrine,
which means potentially that the certifying court may find that the for-
eign state's law refers the question back to the law of the state of the
certifying court or to the law of yet another state. Renvoi is a layer of
analysis for which there is no parallel in a typical Erie situation. Thus,
state courts, faced with a risk of the application of the renvoi doctrine,
might be justified in ignoring certification altogether, and choosing to
apply forum law.102
As a practical matter, use of the renvoi doctrine is infrequent in
American courts, so the last latent obstacle to certification may be more
imagined than real. In a potential renvoi situation, however, the fore-
seeable mire might well make even the most conscientious jurist diffi-
dent about initiating the certification process.
The reasons why state courts have rarely, if ever, certified ques-
tions to courts in other states will probably remain a matter of specula-
tion. The phenomenon of non-certification, however, need not continue.
As this Article suggests, certification can make a major contribution to
resolution of one of the knottiest, most durable problems afflicting
state-to-state choice-of-law analysis: the phenomenon of forum bias.
B. Recognition That Forum Bias Is a Problem
Characterizing a tendency of courts to favor their own state's law
as "bias" inevitably suggests that such a predisposition is undesirable.
Although this Article maintains that forum bias of a certain kind is in-
deed a weakness in choice-of-law analysis, such a view should be a con-
clusion, not a presumption. Therefore, one must first establish why only
some kinds of forum bias should be perceived as undesirable. 0 3
100. As a general rule, state choice-of-law rules afford state courts far more flexibility in
choosing the law to be applied than Erie affords federal courts choosing between state and federal
law. For example, while a state court's formal choice-of-law rules direct the court to apply the law
of another state, the court may nevertheless refuse to do so because it deems application of the law
of another state to be a violation of the forum's "public policy." See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R.
FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 143-45 (4th ed. 1986). No such public policy exception exists
within the Erie system.
101. This requirement is common to certified questions that arise in either federal or state
court.
102. See supra note 100 for an example of the manner in which a court can manipulate state
choice-of-law rules to justify application of forum law, and thereby avoid certification questions
altogether.
103. A criticism of significant judicial reliance on forum law should begin by acknowledging
that: (1) different kinds of forum bias exist; (2) at least one kind of "bias" is properly a part of
standard choice-of-law analysis; and (3) aversion to other kinds of forum bias is not universally
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1. In Defense of Applying Forum Law
The kind of forum bias that is generally approved of-the "good"
bias-begins with the premise that a court deciding a case with multi-
state elements is entitled to assume, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, that the law to be applied is the law of the state in which the
court sits. 0 4 Brainerd Currie, who has been called, with reason, the
"godfather" of modern choice-of-law theories,10 5 explained why this
"good" bias has received such widespread acceptance: "The normal
business of courts being the adjudication of domestic cases, and the
normal tendency of lawyers and judges being to think in terms of do-
mestic law, the normal expectation should be that the rule of decision
will be supplied by the domestic law as a matter of course."106 Because
most lawsuits do not contain interstate components sufficient to raise
choice-of-law considerations, and are therefore properly decided under
forum law, "good" forum bias is essentially a recognition that it is not
unreasonable for a court to place upon interested parties the burden of
explaining why in an unusual circumstance the law of some other juris-
diction should be interposed. Understandably, this sort of forum bias
creates no cause for concern.
A second kind of forum bias appears in the unusual cases contain-
ing multistate elements that arguably justify a court's possible applica-
tion of the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum. These cases
constitute a clear minority of the litigation before courts, and to that
extent are not part of the normal body of litigation that Currie de-
scribed. Cases with multistate elements, however, are the corpus upon
which choice-of-law analysis operates, and it is among them that a dif-
ferent and undesirable kind of forum bias exists. This forum bias picks
up where the "good" forum bias leaves off, overriding arguments for
applying another jurisdiction's law and instead favoring forum law that
properly should have been displaced. The description of what consti-
tutes such undesirable forum bias, as well as of what harm it can do to
proper judicial decisionmaking, is the major topic of this portion of the
Article. 10
shared within the family of choice-of-law scholars.
104. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 263 (indicating that "[tihe
forum court will often have a natural preference for its own substantive law as against the law of
other states. It has been suggested that this is the dominant theme in the entire choice-of-law
process").
105. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 173, 174 (1981).
106. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 75 (1963).
107. From this point forward, reference to "forum bias" will exclude consideration of "good"
forum bias in purely domestic cases, referring instead to the kind of forum bias that appears in
cases that have a substantial link to more than one jurisdiction.
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Even when forum bias appears in a case with multistate elements,
though, the phenomenon has not received universal condemnation. In
fact, some of the leading advocates of modern trends in choice of law
defended, even advocated, a predisposition toward forum law.108 Currie
explicitly advocated the use of forum law to decide cases in which the
forum has a legitimate interest.109 In Currie's scheme, the forum court
would defer to the interests of another state only when the forum had
no legitimate interest in deciding the case under its own law.110 Thus,
under Currie's original technique of interest analysis that is the founda-
tion of modern trends in choice of law, a true weighing of interests of
different states would be exceptional, because the forum law would con-
trol whenever the forum had an interest, which is the most likely scena-
rio. The court would defer only when the forum was disinterested and
the other state had a significant interest, which is a less likely scena-
rio.' Currie even posited a situation in which a disinterested forum
would apply its own law in the face of the competing interests of two
other states. According to Currie, "[i]f the forum is disinterested, but
an unavoidable conflict exists between the laws of the two other states,
108. This Article uses the terms "modern trends" or "modern learning" in choice of law to
connote the ideas put forward and developed by Brainerd Currie and his followers. The basic
thesis of these approaches to choice of law rests on a concept called "interest analysis," in which a
court would apply to an issue the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in having its law
applied. Differences exist regarding the proper details of the modern learning, but in practice the
similarities among various approaches to modern learning are much greater than the theoretical
differences among its proponents. Professor Robert Leflar, for example, has noted that modern
learning in practice "follow[s] a pattern of multiple citation, seldom relying solely upon any single
modern choice-of-law theory, but combining two or more of the theories to produce results which,
interestingly, can be sustained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical approaches to
conflicts law." Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 10
(1977).
The counterpart to modern learning is, unsurprisingly, "traditional learning," whose theories
rest heavily on application of the law of the jurisdiction in which an event took place. Thus in tort,
for example, the applicable law would be the law of the place in which the last event necessary to
complete the tort occurred; in contract, the law to be applied would be the law of the jurisdiction
in which the contract was made or was to be performed, depending on the type of contract ques-
tion at issue. Historically, the Bible of the traditional learning has been the Restatement of the
Law of Conflict of Laws (1934).
109. B. CURRIE, supra note 106, at 183. Currie argued that, "[n]ormally, even in cases involv-
ing foreign elements, the court should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of
decision found in the law of the forum." Id. Currie extended his preference for forum law to the
phenomenon of what he called the "unprovided case." Id. at 152. He believed that, if the forum
had no interest in applying its law because the beneficiary of that choice would be the party not a
resident in the forum, and the other state had no interest in applying its law because the benefi-
ciary of that choice would be the resident of the forum, then the forum should nevertheless apply
its own law. See id. at 152-56. In subsequent discussions, however, Currie slightly modified his
advocacy of forum bias. See infra note 113.
110. B. CURRIE, supra note 106, at 184.
111. For a detailed discussion of these ideas, see id. at 183-87.
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and the court cannot with justice decline to adjudicate the case, it
should apply the law of the forum-until someone comes along with a
better idea." '112
Very few courts and even fewer commentators have formally
adopted Currie's original proposal.113 However, a central truth of the
modern learning as it has actually operated has been an approach that
commonly favors forum law. One of the most prominent and enthusias-
tic proponents of the modern learning, Professor Robert Sedler, has
chronicled the way in which courts that apply modern learning have
handled tort choice-of-law issues."' The results of his research are re-
vealing. Sedler examined the operation of modern learning in fourteen
states, reaching the following general determination: "[W]henever the
courts have concluded that they have a real interest in applying their
own law in order to implement the policies reflected in that law, they
have almost invariably applied their own law. In other words, in prac-
tice the courts have been applying the 'Currie version of interest
analysis.' "115
112. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1963).
113. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 567 (1982) (suggesting that "[t]he
functionalists, Weintraub and von Mehren and Trautman, also regard governmental interests as
relevant to the choice of law process, but-unlike Currie-openly admit and advocate a weighing
of interests rather than the unusually strong forum preference" (footnotes omitted)); Ehrenzweig,
A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377, 389 (1966)
(observing that, "[a]s far as I can see, all courts and writers who have professed acceptance of
Currie's interest language have transformed it by indulging in that very weighing and balancing of
interests from which Currie refrained" (emphasis in original)). But see Foster v. Leggett, 484
S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). In Foster, the Kentucky court applied Kentucky law to a wrongful death
suit in which the accident occurred in Ohio and the defendant was an Ohio domiciliary, but the
decedent had been a domiciliary of Kentucky. In so doing, the court stated: "We are now reaffirm-
ing our position . . . that if there are significant contacts-not necessarily the most significant
contacts-with Kentucky, the Kentucky law should be applied." Id. at 829.
Currie himself modified his original ideas somewhat when he had the benefit of scholarly reac-
tion, suggesting that the forum should take care to ensure that it indeed had a legitimate interest
in applying its own law. If, however, upon careful reflection, the forum decided that it had such an
interest, the conclusion, Currie believed, should still be the application of forum law. See Currie,
supra note 112, at 1242-43.
114. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Con-
flicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975 (1977).
115. Id. at 980 (footnotes omitted). A few years later, Sedler restated the results of his re-
search as follows:
The most "universal" tort rule of choice of law, followed by all the courts that have aban-
doned the traditional approach, is that when two residents of the forum are involved in an
accident in another state, the law of the forum applies. Another rule of choice of law is that
when two parties from a recovery state, without regard to forum residence, are involved in an
accident in a non-recovery state, recovery is allowed. One situation where the courts are di-
vided is where two parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery
state, and suit is brought in the recovery state. The majority view here is that the forum
should apply its own law allowing recovery. Similarly, there have been a number of cases in
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Curiously, this revival of Currie's thinking among advocates of
modern learning has not been met with general disapproval among
those who originally opposed Currie's forum bias. As Sedler noted,
"there seems to be little dispute among the commentators that the
courts are generally reaching functionally sound and fair results in the
cases coming before them for decision.""'  Thus, although the majority
of Currie's scholarly disciples have formally deviated from his overt ad-
vocacy of forum bias in cases with multistate components, the courts
applying the modern approaches have in practice sided with the
founder of the modern school. In the end, the commentators have been
mostly quiet about widespread application of the forum bias they nomi-
nally oppose. It remains for this Article to demonstrate, therefore, why
forum bias should be curtailed. 1 7
2. The Fatal Flaws of Forum Bias
a. Prudential Considerations
Some of the reasons why forum bias is undesirable seem so
straightforward that it is hard to understand why any choice-of-law sys-
tem would encourage forum bias. First, a predisposition toward forum
law-whether built into a system, as Currie recommended, or a by-
product of manipulative techniques, as in the traditional learning-is at
odds with the task of a choice-of-law system. If choice-of-law doctrine
has the goal of choosing the appropriate law to be applied to a suit with
which a recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery state defendant in the defend-
ant's home state, but it is possible for the plaintiff's home state to exercise jurisdiction over
the case, and the plaintiff brings suit there. Here the majority of the courts have held that the
forum should apply its own law allowing recovery.
Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1193, 1199-1200 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
116. Sedler, supra note 115, at 1199 (footnotes omitted). Sedler apparently assumed that the
absence of scholarly criticism of the resurgence in Currie's analysis was a product of sound reason-
ing and fair results. Two other proponents of the modem approaches, however, inadvertently may
have pointed out why scholars of the modem learning criticize so infrequently the judicial applica-
tion of their work. These commentators remarked:
The case law which employs interest analysis presents a confusing picture. Imprecise and
over-zealous citations to sundry authorities often make it difficult to determine with any kind
of certainty on what theory a case may be said to have been decided, if indeed the theories
are fully distinguishable. This imprecision and hedging by the courts invites theorists to claim
an important case as supporting their own thinking ....
E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 113, at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
117. Traditional approaches to choice-of-law problems may also be infected with forum bias;
specifically, courts have justified application of forum law in the face of territorial rules to the
contrary by employing the so-called "manipulative techniques" of the traditional learning. For a
more elaborate discussion of the "manipulative techniques" in traditional learning, see Sedler,
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56
Ky. L.J. 27, 48-53 (1967).
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multistate dimensions, an a priori inclination toward forum law can
only short circuit the analysis. Such short circuiting can be the proper
result only if the choice-of-law system was designed initially to choose
forum law in most cases, as Currie advocated.118
Accepting the thesis that the plaintiff's conscious decision to take
advantage of a court's predisposition toward its own law should not de-
cide choice-of-law questions, it becomes clear that wholesale use of fo-
rum law is not likely to result in the routine selection of the appropriate
law in particular cases. Instead, a systematized preinclination toward
forum law operates irrespective of, or even in opposition to, what the
proper choice-of-law decision (in the absence of forum bias) would be.
Basing choice-of-law decisions on a preinclination toward forum law,
without a circumstance that compels such an approach, 1 9 provides an
appearance of impropriety from the outset.
Apart from the impropriety of a choice-of-law system that is can-
didly, even blatantly, predisposed toward one body of law, other pru-
dential considerations also suggest the lack of wisdom in such an
approach. One such consideration derives from the operation of Ameri-
can courts as part of a federal system, in which most choice-of-law deci-
sions involve selection or rejection of the law of a sister state, rather
than the law of some truly foreign sovereign. The federal system oper-
ates more efficiently when the states behave with substantial respect for
one another, including respect for the appropriateness of applying one
another's law. Forum bias between states is little more than an expres-
sion of prejudice against the laws of co-equal states in a federal system.
While such bias is of itself quite unlikely to shake the foundations of
the federal system, it may be a source of unnecessary friction.
Moreover, although federalism will obviously survive poor choice-
of-law systems, the deleterious impact of forum bias is not necessarily
trivial. Beyond whatever corrosive influence forum bias may have on
state judicial relationships, an unreasonable predisposition toward fo-
rum law also undermines judicial doctrine itself. Scholars may and
often do dispute the relative merits of competing legal doctrines, but
few commentators would argue with a premise that sound legal doctrine
fairly applied is or should be an important part of judicial decisionmak-
ing in the United States. Thus, in choice-of-law doctrine reasonable
grounds may exist to argue for or against the relative merits of various
systems or variants thereon; but, once a choice-of-law system is se-
118. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
119. This Article has previously discussed circumstances in which forum bias in choice of law
may indeed be a proper, and perhaps the only proper, approach. See supra notes 104-06 and ac-
companying text. In the context of the current discussion, however, no similar compelling circum-
stance exists.
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lected, courts should apply that system fairly and consistently. When
forum bias interferes with the application of law to which a choice-of-
law analysis would otherwise direct a judge, forum bias casts a shadow
of skepticism over choice of law and, by extrapolation, over the validity
of judicial doctrines generally. This skepticism may be a subtle price to
pay, but in the long run it certainly could be an expensive one, particu-
larly since forum bias is no longer only an unfortunate byproduct of
parochial choice-of-law decisions, but is also a substantial part of
choice-of-law systems themselves.
b. Systematized Forum Bias
When the traditional learning flourished across the United States,
courts ameliorated the rigidity of the territorial approach upon which
traditional learning was based by the use of "manipulative techniques"
that allowed judges to achieve results they deemed more nearly just.12
In practice, the more just result was "generally the application of forum
law. ' 12 1 To the extent that forum bias had infected traditional learning,
the traditional approaches were no better than the more modern
choice-of-law techniques.
An important difference exists, however, between forum bias in
traditional learning and forum bias that has been nearly institutional-
ized in the modern approaches. In traditional courts, forum bias crept
in through the application of the manipulative techniques that courts
had used to escape from the territorial rules in exceptional cases. Thus,
absent manipulative techniques, a court's application of traditional
learning under the First Restatement of the Law of Conflicts of Laws
normally would not include an infusion of forum bias, and the case af-
fected by forum bias would be the exceptional one. In the modern
learning, however, forum bias may be "the dominant theme in the en-
tire choice-of-law process."' Therefore, while both traditional and
120. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 262 (in the traditional
learning, use of a manipulative technique "may turn on a judicial desire to achieve justice in the
particular case, on a public policy preference for one rule of law over another, on a preference for
the forum state's own rule of law, on the plaintiff's pleadings, or on something else other than pure
logic"). Writing of the manipulative technique of characterizing an issue as procedural, rather than
substantive, so that a court could employ the forum's procedural law, the authors added:
When a. . . rule. . . is held to be procedural, so that a locally favored rule can be applied, it
is apparent that the characterization technique is being used to achieve results that must be
justified, if at all, by other real reasons. That other real reasons may exist cannot be doubted.
The valid questions are as to what the real reasons are, and why a cover-up device should be
manipulated to conceal them.
Id. at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
121. Sedler, supra note 117, at 49.
122. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 263; see also supra notes 108-16
and accompanying text.
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modern systems have a problem to shed, the task will probably be more
difficult in states that have adopted some variant of Currie's ideas that
contains a predisposition toward the law of the forum.
c. In Personam Jurisdiction and Forum Bias
Just as many states have shifted to the more heavily forum-biased
modern approaches to choice of law, the evolution of another legal doc-
trine has exacerbated the effect of forum bias in the modern learn-
ing-the doctrine of in personam jurisdiction, which has experienced
notable expansion in American courts in the last forty years.
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,123 and subsequent decisions, state courts and
federal courts sitting in diversity cases have extended their ability to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. While im-
portant considerations of constitutional fairness still prevent unlimited
assertions of jurisdiction, 24 the post-International Shoe period of in
personam jurisdiction has been one in which plaintiffs have had choices
among fora for which American legal history provides no precedent.
That expansion of jurisdiction has had a catalytic effect on forum bias,
creating opportunities for choice-of-law shopping about which nine-
teenth-century lawyers could not even have dreamed.
A modification of the facts of McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.12 5 demonstrates how the symbiosis between jurisdiction and
forum bias can work to the plaintiff's advantage. The plaintiff in Mc-
Gee was a California resident who sued a Texas insurance company to
obtain the proceeds of a life insurance policy. Beyond matters relating
to the single policy at issue in McGee, the Texas company had no con-
tacts with California. Prior to International Shoe, those facts probably
would have forced the plaintiff to initiate the action somewhere other
than in California, for California courts could not have extended their
in personam jurisdiction to reach the defendant. After International
Shoe, however, the California courts could entertain the suit and enter
a judgment for the plaintiff that Texas courts would have to enforce. 26
Although McGee did not involve any insurance contract choice-of-law
issues, injecting a choice-of-law issue into its facts will demonstrate how
expansive notions of in personam jurisdiction may play into the hands
of plaintiffs who know how to exploit forum bias.
123. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
124. See, e.g., Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (contacts with forum
initiated by plaintiff do not create in personam jurisdiction over defendant).
125. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
126. Id. at 221.
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An issue that the California courts had to address in McGee was
whether the insured had committed suicide. 12 7 The choice-of-law prob-
lem, and opportunity, presented by expanded in personam jurisdiction
becomes clearer by changing the facts of McGee to assume, first, that
under California law the company still would have to pay on the policy
notwithstanding a suicide, and, second, that Texas law would discharge
the company from its obligation to pay if death was caused by suicide.
Recall that, prior to International Shoe, the plaintiff in McGee may
have been able to sue in only the one state in which the defendant com-
pany would certainly be found-Texas. After International Shoe, how-
ever, the plaintiff had the choice of suing in either California or Texas.
If forum bias plays the role in choice of law that Currie wanted it
to play (and Sedler reported that it actually does play), the plaintiff's
choice of forum becomes the controlling decision in the case. On the
altered facts of McGee, a California court using California's version of
modern learning as influenced by forum bias would likely apply Califor-
nia law, and the plaintiff would collect under the policy even if the in-
sured had committed suicide. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff chose
to sue in Texas, the risk is substantial that forum bias would induce a
Texas court to apply Texas law, and the plaintiff would lose if the in-
sured did in fact commit suicide. It is clear where any conscientious
attorney representing the plaintiff should file suit. Equally clear is that
the plaintiff's choice of forum effectively controls the outcome of the
case. Thus, the expansion of in personam jurisdiction inadvertently has
created a situation in which resourceful plaintiffs may: first, pick and
choose among constitutionally eligible fora; second, select the jurisdic-
tion with the law most favorable to plaintiffs; and, third, with forum
bias in mind, likely gain an important advantage over the defendant (if
not outright victory) even before the court begins to address the merits.
The traditional learning is a bit less favorable to plaintiffs, ironi-
cally because of the intervention of the "manipulative techniques" so
derided by commentators and advocates of the modern approaches." 8
Commentators generally acknowledge that, in the traditional learning,
judges often use some manipulative technique to introduce forum bias,
which enables the judge, in an individual case, to achieve justice by in-
troducing some factor that alters the outcome from that which would
have been reached using only territorial rules. 2 9 Of course, the motive
for manipulation may often be forum bias, but judges bound by tradi-
tional approaches apparently use manipulative techniques substantially
127. Id. at 222.
128. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
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to reach just results.130 Thus, when a court using traditional analysis
reaches for the law of the forum by manipulative techniques, it may
well be more than just a case of bias toward local law. The court may
indeed desire to achieve justice in a particular case, irrespective of
whether the forum law or foreign law is more likely to achieve that
result.
The difference between modern and traditional learning on the ap-
plication of forum bias is in who makes the decision to use forum law.
Under the modern systems, the commentators acknowledge candidly
that the preference for forum law is sufficiently strong to be almost part
of the choice-of-law system itself-as Currie wanted. 131 In such circum-
stances, any capable plaintiff's attorney can make the system work for
the client, since forum law essentially becomes the law that the plain-
tiff-hardly a disinterested party-wishes to have applied to the case.
In traditional learning, a different forum bias exists that commentators
have regularly unearthed. In many cases in which courts apply forum
law through use of a manipulative technique, the commentators ac-
knowledge that the motive for manipulation may be the desire of a dis-
interested judge to achieve justice, however defined, in an individual
case.
13 2
Forum bias remains undesirable in both traditional and modern
learning, and the ability to exploit forum bias through expanded princi-
ples of in personam jurisdiction makes such bias an effective tool for
disadvantaging defendants. Forum bias, however, is apparently less an
intrinsic part of the traditional system; and within the traditional sys-
tem judges do not seem to apply forum bias more or less automatically
(as in the modern learning), but only with discretion that is influenced
more by a judge's desire to do justice based on the merits of a particu-
lar case than by favoritism toward forum law. Although difficult to de-
fend on this basis alone, the traditional learning at least may be
preferable to letting the plaintiff choose the applicable law through the
almost routinized forum bias of modern systems.
In any event, under either modern or traditional approaches, forum
bias clearly has received an unintended boost from expanded principles
of in personam jurisdiction, and has effectively permitted resourceful
plaintiffs to enjoy an undeserved, but often decisive, advantage in their
maneuvers against defendants. One solution to this disturbing phenom-
enon might be to reduce the scope of in personam jurisdiction. The his-
130. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 257 (manipulative
technique of "[c]haracterization can be employed as a result-selective device").
131. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing Currie's advocacy of forum
preference and its reception among scholars and the courts).
132. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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tory of the last forty years, however, and the experience prior to 1945
with jurisdictional principles articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 33 suggest
that a return to old ways of obtaining in personam jurisdiction is
neither practical nor desirable. The other alternative, therefore, is to
search for techniques that help curb forum bias. At this point, certifica-
tion is a particularly promising technique.
C. Certification as an Antidote for Forum Bias
Forum bias exists in part because the modern approaches to choice
of law have justified its existence.3 4 The existence of forum bias in the
traditional learning185 suggests, however, that something beyond the
persuasive advocacy of Brainerd Currie-advocacy opposed by other
proponents of modern learning' 36 -also accounts for courts' strong pre-
disposition toward their own law. In the absence of empirical evidence,
reason suggests that the other possible explanation of forum bias con-
cerns judges' familiarity with. forum law and corresponding unfamiliar-
ity with the law of other jurisdictions.13 7 To understand why this
explanation is probably accurate, one must appreciate a difference be-
tween the need of federal judges to use certification to compensate for
their lack of knowledge of foreign law and the countervailing desire of
state judges to use their own familiar law.
Lack of familiarity with state law among federal judges sitting in
diversity has pushed at least some federal courts to take advantage of
certification statutes. But there is a difference between the context in
which federal courts under Erie principles deal with state law and the
circumstances in which state courts make state-to-state choice-of-law
decisions. The Erie doctrine constrains federal courts sitting in diver-
133. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Pennoyer's territorial principles of in personam jurisdiction were
abandoned because the United States had become a much more mobile society. See R. LEFLA, L.
McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 43. The United States has continued its trend toward
greater mobility at an accelerated rate in the last forty years, which suggests that territorial rules
would be even less appropriate now than they were at the end of World War II, when Interna-
tional Shoe was decided.
134. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
137. See R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 100, at 264. Forum bias can be
"that 'counsel of despair' which is said to be the last resource of puzzled critics who ignore true
choice-of-law considerations, give up the effort to effectuate them, and merely seek an easy way
out, as when forum law is applied without reasoned justification." Id.
Apart from the predisposition toward forum law that familiarity with local law would breed,
forum bias might also be in some measure a product of mindless parochialism that might, for
example, incline a judge in New York to apply New York law because he or she could not seriously
contemplate that non-New York law could ever be as good. If a parochial source of forum bias
exists, the availability of certification or any other judicial technique is unlikely to expunge it. The
only realistic hope is that such prejudice plays only a very minor role in choice-of-law decisions.
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sity in their federal/state choice-of-law decisions. 3 8 As a result, when
directed by Erie principles to employ state law, as they frequently are,
federal courts have already been forced to forego the temptation of
turning to familiar federal law for solutions. By contrast, the systems
governing choice-of-law decisions in state-to-state situations afford
state courts greater opportunity to manipulate the results; certainly the
institutionalization of forum bias that is characteristic of the modern
approaches to choice of law encourages state courts to use their own law
in derogation of the law of other states.
The choice-of-law system at work in diversity cases thus forces fed-
eral judges to contemplate what unresolved state law might be, but the
different choice-of-law systems employed in state courts typically allow
or encourage judges unfamiliar with non-forum law simply to apply
their own law. In such circumstances, it should not be surprising that
certification is rarely, if ever, employed even by state courts that may
be eligible to take advantage of certification statutes. 3 9 Nevertheless,
state courts may use certification to cut through the forum bias that
currently hampers proper choice-of-law decisions.
If forum bias is something to be discouraged, rather than systema-
tized, and if reasons of easy familiarity and applicability as much as any
theoretical justification emanating from the mind of Brainerd Currie
explain the existence of forum bias, then certification can help to ease
the problem of forum bias in state-to-state choice-of-law situations. As
currently employed in federal courts obligated to apply state law, certi-
fication offers an avenue to the definitive resolution of difficult or un-
resolved questions of state law. When the same uncertainties affect
state courts deciding cases with multistate implications, there is no rea-
son why certification could not achieve similar results. To the extent
that certification proved a satisfactory tool in the hands of state courts,
it would provide judges who were inclined to escape forum bias with a
means of determining accurately the law of another state. Assuming,
therefore, that judges almost always would prefer to achieve proper re-
sults rather than merely rely on forum law, the question that remains is
how well certification has actually operated in the context of federal-
state certification.
138. For a discussion of the Erie doctrine, see supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the utility of certifica-
tion based on responses from judges and justices who have worked with the process, see infra notes
140-77 and accompanying text.
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V. EMPIRICAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS
A. Methodology and Scope of Empirical Study
To determine the usefulness and effectiveness of the certification
process as it has operated between federal and state courts, we con-
ducted an empirical study of state and federal judges and state clerks of
court. 1 0 In seeking to determine judicial responses to the many argu-
ments and complaints surrounding the certification process, question-
naires were sent to federal and state judges experienced with
certification.14 1 The questionnaires sought candid responses from fed-
eral and state judges on the practical and theoretical workings of the
certification procedure. 4 2 The questionnaire asked the judges to re-
spond in light of the cases in which they participated. When applicable,
a list of certification cases authored by the judge was sent to the judge
with the questionnaire.
State questionnaires were sent to sixty-six judges or justices of the
various state supreme courts, or the equivalent highest court of the
state; thirty-one judges responded. s4 3 The questionnaires were sent to
judges in state courts that actively use the certification process and are
statutorily permitted to engage in state-to-state certification. LEXIS
was employed to identify state court opinions responding to certified
questions. Of these cases, the survey focused on those certification cases
occurring after 1982 to ensure that the case and record would be availa-
ble to the judges surveyed.
The federal questionnaire was sent to sixty-four federal judges;
eighteen judges responded. 4 4 To identify federal certifying judges not
mentioned in published state certification opinions, assistance was
sought from federal and state clerks of court. In most instances, the
federal opinions were unpublished and only the action numbers of the
140. This section of the Article reports the findings of our survey of federal and state judges.
The survey was conducted from July to October 1985. We extend our thanks to Dr. Carroll Seron
and the Federal Judicial Center for their assistance in the formulation of the questionnaire. In
1983 the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of federal judges concerning the certification
process. C. SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Federal
Judicial Center 1983). With the permission of Carroll Seron, author of the report, Part III of that
survey was incorporated into our questionnaire of state and federal judges.
141. Judges responsible for certification cases were identified using LEXIS, and, when not
cited in the state certification decision, the federal court and judges involved were identified by
contacting the appropriate state court.
142. See infra Appendix C (state judges' questionnaire and responses); Appendix D (federal
judges' questionnaire and responses).
143. See infra Appendix A (listing state judges asked to respond and indicating those who
did respond to the questionnaire).
144. See infra Appendix B (listing federal judges asked to respond and indicating those who
did respond to the questionnaire).
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certified cases were available for research.
The federal and state questionnaires were drafted to provide re-
sponsive answers to the many complaints made about certification.145 In
an attempt to compile the information in a manner conducive to com-
parison between the federal and state judges' responses, three of the
four sections of the questionnaire sent to the federal and state judges
were identical. 46 Part One of the federal and state questionnaires dealt
explicitly with the unique problems and procedures of an answering or
certifying court. 147
Part Two of both questionnaires sought to obtain objective re-
sponses from the federal and state judges on highly debated certifica-
tion issues. The twenty-one questions in this section of the
questionnaires each contained four possible responses to the declarative
statements posed: (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) disagree; and (4)
strongly disagree. Each answer was tabulated independently and in con-
junction with its federal or state counterpart for comparison. 48
Part Three of the questionnaires, originally drafted for the Federal
Judicial Center's 1983 survey of federal judges, sought to determine the
process employed by judges when determining whether to certify or an-
swer a certified question of law. The judges were asked to evaluate the
weight afforded particular factual or procedural situations. The judges
were given four possible responses to the twelve statements posed: (1)
great weight; (2) some weight; (3) little weight; and (4) not applicable.
Each answer here, too, was tabulated independently and in conjunction
with its federal or state counterpart for comparison. 14 9
Part Four of the questionnaires was an open-ended question, seek-
ing to elicit comments or concerns that were incapable of being ex-
pressed in the former, more restricted sections of the questionnaire.
The judges were asked whether, in their opinion, the advantages of cer-
tification outweighed its disadvantages. 50
The questionnaires sent to the state clerks of court were designed
to compile information concerning the extent of certification's use and
the procedural requirements pertaining to its use. Although more tech-
nical than the judges' questionnaire, the survey of the clerks provided
important information concerning the burden that the certification pro-
145. See supra notes 28-102 and accompanying text (discussing potential problems with
certification).
146. The complete state and federal questionnaires are reproduced in Appendices C and D.
147. See infra Appendices C & D (noting responses to individual questions in survey).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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cess imposes on litigants.151
B. Summary of Findings
1. Summary of Responses to Questionnaires Sent to Judges
a. Part One
In responding to questions focusing on their unique role as judges
on the court answering certified questions, the state judges surveyed
overwhelmingly agreed that the federal court (or federal parties) had
clearly formulated the certified questions. Almost two-thirds of the re-
sponding judges noted that both the questions and the statement of
facts were adequate to decide the certified questions, which made it un-
necessary to reformulate the questions posed. While only three judges
felt that the questions certified were not sufficiently clear, six judges
found it necessary to reformulate the questions. Although one Iowa
judge considered the certified questions unclear and the statement of
facts inadequate to decide the issues, the same judge did not find it
necessary to reformulate the certified questions.'52
In a more consistent response, twenty-three judges declared that
they would use the certified answers as precedent. While no state judge
would decline to use the certified answers as precedent, four judges
voiced uncertainty over the precedential value of certified answers. One
state judge remarked that the precedential weight of the certified an-
swer would depend on whether the opinion was published. 5 '
Responding to questions focusing on their roles as judges on the
certifying court, a majority of the federal judges indicated that they had
granted certification of an issue after the issue had been briefed and
argued. Only one federal judge certified an issue of law before the issue
was briefed, while four of the sixteen federal judges responding to these
questions invoked certification after disposition.
Sixteen of the federal judges granted certification because the ques-
tions involved were issues of first impression. Nine judges found it diffi-
cult or very difficult to determine if state court precedent controlled the
issue, while seven judges did not consider determining the state court
precedent a difficult task.15 4
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text (discussing abstractness and difficulties in
formulating certified questions).
153. See infra Appendix C (reporting Justice James Carter's response to the state certifica-
tion questionnaire); see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discussing advisory opinions).
154. This response is consistent with Part Three of the questionnaire, in which 12 of the 19
responding judges noted that they were more likely to certify issues dealing with previously uncon-
strued state statutes. Also responding to Part Three, a majority of the federal judges accorded
"little weight" to the identity of the answering court as a factor in making their decisions to certify
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While all of the responding judges noted that they would not have
abstained from deciding the case if the certification procedure were not
available, a majority of the judges said that the state answer resolved
the case.115
b. Part Two
The federal and the state judges' responses to the first question of
Part Two of the questionnaire-concerning the identity of the moving
party in certification cases-were inconsistent. On the state level, a ma-
jority of the responding judges "strongly agreed" that courts should al-
low certification only by motion of the court. The federal judges were
split on the issue of who may move for certification. Both the federal
and state judges strongly disagreed with the proposition that certifica-
tion should be allowed only by motion of the parties. A majority of fed-
eral judges and a near majority of the state judges responding to the
survey, however, felt that the identity of the moving party in certifica-
tion cases made no difference.
The federal or state identity of the judges proved to be an impor-
tant factor concerning a number of issues. While the federal judges
agreed that the receiving court should accord certified questions prior-
ity status, the state courts were split on the issue. Similarly, the state
courts overwhelmingly agreed that courts should certify only determi-
native issues, while the federal judges were almost evenly split on the
issue.
Deviating from this normal response pattern, state judges indicated
that state courts should not be offended when a federal court decides
issues of state law. The federal judges, on the other hand, expressed
mixed views on the issue. Similarly, both the federal and state judges
overwhelmingly agreed that certification allows the federal court to re-
solve the issues in a case while respecting the state court's authority.
Both the federal and state judges responded positively to the possi-
ble precedential value, stare decisis, and res judicata effects of certified
questions. On the state level, while a large majority of the state judges
supported these propositions, two Kentucky Supreme Court judges
strongly disagreed with all of the propositions. One Minnesota state
judge and one Kansas state judge disagreed with the proposition that
certified questions should have the same stare decisis and res judicata
effects as other court opinions, while three Minnesota and Kansas
judges either agreed or strongly agreed that the answers to certified
questions should have standard stare decisis and res judicata effects. On
the question of law.
155. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (discussing abstention doctrine).
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the federal level, every federal judge who responded to the survey
agreed that certified questions should receive the same precedential
value, stare decisis, and res judicata effects as other court opinions.
The federal and state judges were almost in complete agreement on
several controversial issues surrounding certification. Regarding the de-
lay and expense of the certification process, an overwhelming majority
of both the federal and state judges disagreed with the statement that
these factors make certification an impractical procedure for litigants. 15 6
Similarly, both the federal and state judges disagreed with the proposi-
tions that state courts should be required to answer questions certified
and that courts should allow certification only when a federal constitu-
tional question would be avoided by a state response. Most importantly,
neither the federal nor the state judges felt that certified questions were
too abstract for judicial resolution. On a closer issue, five of the eight-
een federal judges and ten of the twenty-eight state judges stated that
certified questions seek advisory opinions.157
c. Part Three
Part Three of the questionnaire sought to determine the process
used in making certification decisions and the weight afforded certain
factual situations. Although one Iowa state judge did not answer Part
Three, stating that "[w]e have no choice,"' 58 both the federal and state
judges agreed on the number one determinative factor involving certifi-
cation and were in close agreement on the top four factors that have an
impact on certification decisions. Table 1 sets out the factors that
judges consider most important in their decision to certify a question.
The factors considered least important in the certification decision
varied between the federal and state judges. Only one of the eleven fac-
tual situations-"concerns about forum shopping"-obtained a consis-
156. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (discussing problems of expense and
delay).
157. See supra notes 34-61 and accompanying text (discussing issues of advisory opinions
and abstractness in certification).
158. Larson, Response to State Questionnaire on Certification (on file with Author).
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Table 1
Top Four Factors Obtaining a "Great Weight" Response
from State and Federal Judges
Number of Federal Number of State
Judges Responding Judges Responding
Factor
Question refers to new or
previously unconstrued
state statute 12 15
Closeness of state law
question 10 9
Strength of foreign
court's interest in area
of law 8 10
Avoiding inconsistency
with later foreign court
decisions 8 9
tent "least weight" response from the federal and state judges. Table 2
and Table 3 list the factors that the state and federal judges considered
least important in their decision to certify a question.
Table 2
Top Five Factors Obtaining a "Little Weight" Response
from State Judges
Number of Judges choosing
Factor "Little Weight" Response
Extent of delay of disposition with
certification 11
Concern about forum shopping 10
Identity of certifying court 9
Experience with the usefulness of
certification 8
Attractiveness as an alternative to
complete abstention 8
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Table 3
Top Five Factors Obtaining a "Little Weight" Response
from Federal Judges
Number of Judges choosing
Factor "Little Weight" Response
Concern about forum shopping 8
Attractiveness as an alternative to
complete abstention 7
Identity of certifying or answering court 6
Extent of delay of disposition with
certification 5
If not certified, the forum court would
have to apply the law of the non-
forum state 5
d. Part Four
In responding to Part Four of the questionnaire, which asked
whether the advantages of certification outweigh its disadvantages, re-
sponding judges approved of the certification process by a solid margin.
Many judges, however, expressed concern that the process may be used
too liberally.
On the state level, Justice Herbert Wilkins of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts noted certification's potential for abuse. In
voicing some of the complaints directed at certification, Justice Wilkins
stated that "[t]here are times when the facts are important and not
certified (or perhaps even found). We have had some where the certifi-
cation came too early in the case."' 59 Another state justice noted, how-
ever, that his court's "experience has been that only advisory opinions
have been rendered."' 160
Of those federal judges responding to this part of the question-
naire, only Judge John Reynolds of the Eastern District of Wisconsin
flatly rejected the usefulness of the certification process. Judge Reyn-
olds wrote that certification "places too heavy a burden on little liti-
gants. It is OK for institutional litigants that are represented by
159. See infra Appendix C, Part IV (reporting Justice Herbert Wilkins' response to the state
certification questionnaire). For a detailed discussion of the dangers surrounding the formulation
of certified questions, see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
160. See infra Appendix C, Part IV (reporting Justice Donald Wintersheimer's response to
the state certification questionnaire). For a detailed discussion of the advisory opinion question,
see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
institutional type law firms." 161 Judge William Stuart of the Southern
District of Iowa noted that "[w]e have been selective on the issues certi-
fied. I don't think the Iowa Supreme Court feels we have abused the
procedure."' 2
2. Summary of Responses to Questionnaires
Sent to Clerks of State Courts
The questionnaire sent to the clerks of court focused on the proce-
dural aspects of certification. This information proves useful in evaluat-
ing the merit of many of the arguments against certification. Most
importantly, the clerks of court from Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, North
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin stated that certification increases
the highest state court's caseload by less than five percent a year. In
responding to a question concerning the number of certified questions
denied by the individual state courts in the last three years, only West
Virginia denied more than ten certified questions.
The clerks' responses to the controversial issue of the cost that cer-
tification imposes on litigants were more consistent than anticipated.
The costs indicated in Table 4, however, include only the filing fees
established by the individual state courts and in no way represent the
total cost of the certification process. Attorney's fees, always the top
expense in any litigation, cannot be estimated due to the uncertainty of
the amount of work required to certify issues to particular state courts.
Table 4
Court Costs of Certification in Responding States
State Cost
Wisconsin $150
Kansas 55
Iowa 50
Maryland 50
North Dakota 50
The procedures by which the individual states handle certified
questions, which procedures are outlined in Table 5, have a substantial
impact on the total cost imposed on litigants. By allowing counsel for
the parties to present briefs and oral argument on the certified issue,
the state courts ease many of the arguments raised against certification,
161. See infra Appendix D, Part IV (reporting Judge John Reynolds' response to the federal
certification questionnaire).
162. See id. (reporting Judge William Stuart's response to the federal certification
questionnaire).
[Vol. 41:411
INTERJURISDICTIONAL CERTIFICATION
particularly the abstractness and advisory opinion arguments, while en-
hancing the argument that certification imposes a heavy burden on
litigants.
Table 5
Responding States' Process for Certification Cases
Procedure
Certified questions set for briefing?
Certified questions set for oral
argument?
Certified opinions published?
State
Yes: Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
North Dakota
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Yes: Same, except in
Iowa, where it varied
among courts
Yes: Same, except in
Iowa, where it varied
among courts
The extensive process employed by the responding states in resolv-
ing certified questions of law has increased the amount of time from
filing to disposition of the original case. 163 Table 6 lists the amount of
time that the responding states require to resolve certified questions of
law.
Table 6
Responding States' Amount of Time from Filing
Certified Questions to Disposition
State Months
Iowa
Maryland
Kansas, North Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin
9-12
6-9
3-6
C. Analysis of Findings
Because many of the questions in the survey closely relate to one
another, the questionnaires may be broken down into a few distinct is-
sue-oriented categories. These categories include: first, issues concern-
163. See infra Appendix D, Part I, Question 6.
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ing the certification procedure (who can invoke certification and at
what stage certification should be invoked); second, the similarity of a
certified answer to an advisory opinion, which encompasses issues of
question formulation, determinative nature of the issue, and the stare
decisis and res judicata effects of the state opinion; and, third, the im-
pact of the certification process on the litigants, which encompasses is-
sues of expense and delay.
1. Procedural Concerns
The questions of who may seek certification and at what stage cer-
tification should be granted have always been at the heart of the certifi-
cation debate. While commentators and some courts urge that
certification procedures should prohibit federal defendants who remove
a case to the federal court from invoking certification,164 the federal and
state judges responding to our survey disagreed. Similarly, the judges
expressed little apprehension that certification might promote forum
shopping.
Some commentators and judges support the enactment of certifica-
tion statutes that would allow the state court to accept only questions
certified by appellate courts.'65 The federal judges overwhelmingly re-
jected this circumscribed approach to certification. Only one federal
judge expressed any support for this limitation on certification.
164. See Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Garrison, Webb & Stanaland, P.A., 823 F.2d 434, 438 (11th
Cir. 1987) (denying request for certification, court remarked: "Having sought a Federal forum,
[plaintiff] must abide by federal determination as to the present state of Florida law"); Cantwell v.
University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977) (suggesting that "[t]he bar should take notice
that one who chooses the federal courts in diversity actions is in a peculiarly poor position to seek
certification"); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DiviSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 296 (1969) (indicating that "[i]t is ordinarily undesirable to allow a defend-
ant a federal determination of facts and a state determination of state law at the cost or delay to a
plaintiff who was content to have the whole case promptly determined in the state courts"). In
Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983), the Kansas Supreme
Court noted that the defendant in the case had removed the case to the federal court system. The
court, however, did not mention whether this fact had any bearing on the ability of the defendant
to move for certification of state law questions. Id. at 989, 666 P.2d at 713.
Timing of the certification request may often be as important as whether the party making the
request is the same party who invoked federal jurisdiction. In Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co., 823
F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1987), the plaintiffs moved for certification after the district court had entered
summary judgment against them. Affirming a denial of the certification motion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that, "[o]nce a question is submitted for decision in
the district court, the parties should be bound by the outcome unless other grounds for reversal
are present." Id. at 210. The court indicated that "[o]nly in limited circumstances should certifica-
tion be granted after a case has been decided." Id. The court did not identify circumstances in
which post-judgment certification might be appropriate.
165. See supra note 77.
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2. Similarity of Certified Answers to Advisory Opinions
Only one-third of the federal and state judges surveyed agreed with
the proposition that certified questions seek advisory opinions. This re-
sponse rebuts in some measure the argument that state answers to cer-
tified questions are advisory opinions.' s In addition, both the federal
and state judges flatly rejected the contention that certified questions
are too abstract for judicial resolution. 6 7
In rejecting "advisory opinion" and "abstractness" charges against
certification, courts have relied on a number of procedural devices. In
particular, courts use the "determinative" language of certification stat-
utes to guard against the charge that certified issues do not present an-
swering courts with actual cases and controversies. 6 s While the state
judges overwhelmingly agreed that only issues determinative of the case
should be certified, the federal judges expressed mixed opinions on the
issue.
The U.L.A. instructs the certifying court to send a statement of
facts to the answering court.1 9 Although the clarity of the certified
questions and the statement of facts has remained a central issue in the
certification debate, the state judges responding to the survey found the
certified questions sufficiently clear. 70 The clarity of the issues and
statement of facts may be due to the fact that federal courts, either on
their own or in conjunction with the parties, formulate a majority of the
certification memoranda.'17
Another consideration that minimizes concern about advisory opin-
ions is the federal courts' tendency to treat state court responses as the
"final, decisive answer" on the issue posed.'7 2 Every federal judge and
all but four of the state judges agreed that answers to certified ques-
166. Comment, supra note 34, at 172; see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing advisory opinions).
167. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing issue of abstractness).
168. See, e.g., In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966) (refusing to answer certified questions
not determinative of federal case); Hanchey v. Steighner, 549 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976) (noting
that court will not decide issue unless it is dispositive of federal case).
169. U.L.A. § 3 directs that "[a] certification order shall set forth . . . a statement of all
facts." U.L.A. § 3, 12 U.LA, supra note 31, at 53 (emphasis added).
170. For a discussion of problems in formulating certification questions properly, see supra
notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
171. Examples of the practice of a federal court formulating the certification memorandum
may readily be found in opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See,
e.g., Cesary v. Second Nat'l Bank of N. Miami, 567 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978); Ward v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044, 1050 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976); Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660,
664 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975); Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1971).
172. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 1968); see also
supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit's increasing respect for answers
to certified questions).
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tions should be afforded the same precedential, stare decisis, and res
judicata effects as other court opinions.
3. Time and Expense of Certification
The federal judges' response to the issue of time delay created by
certification was unexpectedly inconsistent. While eight federal judges
conceded that certified questions delayed the final decision in the case
substantially longer than would otherwise have been the case, nine
judges responded that they reached the final decision in cases involving
certified questions in about the same amount of time or faster than in
other, non-certification, cases.
In Part Two of the questionnaire, both the federal and state judges
overwhelmingly disagreed with the proposition that the expense and
delay created by certification made the procedure impractical for liti-
gants.173 When deciding to certify or answer a certified question, federal
and state judges gave only little or some weight to the likelihood that
certification would impose significant additional delay on litigants. Un-
like their state counterparts, however, federal judges did not feel that
the regular use of the certification procedure would diminish time
delays.
Upon reviewing the responses from the clerks of courts, however, a
different perception of the delay factor may arise. The state clerks re-
ported that the time from filing to disposition of answers to certified
questions requires, in most cases, from three to six months, and, in
some cases, from six to twelve months. Even allowing for delay that
might have occurred if the federal court had pondered and decided the
difficult question without certification, the clerks' responses support the
use of certification only in cases in which the court is confident that
certification will not unreasonably burden the litigants.
Both the federal and state judges surveyed rejected the proposition
that state courts should be required to answer questions certified to
them. This sentiment is consistent with the basic theory supporting the
use of certification: state courts should interpret state law when and in
what manner they deem appropriate.174 Under the U.L.A.'s certification
statute, however, state courts' power to answer questions certified to
them is mandatory. Although the State of Washington uses mandatory
language in its certification statute's "Power to Answer" provision, this
173. For a general discussion of certification's impact on litigants, see supra notes 76-93 and
accompanying text.
174. See Vestal, supra note 1, at 635 (decision to answer normally discretionary in state
court).
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position has little support among federal or state judges."
Finally, federal and state judges responding to the survey con-
cluded that the federal courts' use of certification improves federal-
state comity.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Certification at Work
When federal courts must decide questions of state law, the use of
certification unquestionably resolves many of the complaints directed at
its predecessor, abstention. While both processes allow the appropriate
state court to decide issues of state law, certification avoids the unnec-
essary delay created by routine court procedures. Certification requires
the litigants to ascertain the appropriate state court response to an is-
sue of state law, but allows the litigants to bypass lower state courts in
obtaining that decision.
Certification not only achieves the objectives of abstention with
less impact on the parties, but it also provides litigants with a clear
precedent that courts may follow in future cases. As both the federal
and state judges agreed, if the state court is not ready to decide the
certified issue of law, the court is under no obligation to do so.176
The results of our empirical study rebut some of the major argu-
ments surrounding the certification process, and outline the many fac-
tors that judges weigh when determining whether to certify or answer a
question of law. Although the responses to the questionnaires contain
some internal inconsistencies, these instances were insubstantial and
therefore do not impact on the results of the survey.
The federal and state judges who responded to the survey generally
indicated overwhelming judicial support for the certification process. A
large majority of the federal judges found the process to be a conven-
ient and appropriate method for ascertaining controlling state law. The
state judges agreed that certification affords the state courts their ap-
propriate decisionmaking role. Although both federal and state judges
acknowledged the burden that certification may impose on litigants, the
burden proved to be much less important than commentators had ini-
tially anticipated when measured against the benefits of certification.
The empirical study demonstrated, in short, that problems associ-
ated with certification probably have been overstated, while the prom-
175. Telephone interview with Assistant Clerk of Courts of Massachusetts (July 16, 1985);
telephone interview with Clerk of Courts of Kansas (July 16, 1985).
176. Federal judges responding to the survey, however, indicated that, if certification were
unavailable because state courts would not respond to certified questions posed, federal judges
would generally not abstain from deciding the issue of state law.
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ised benefit of the process in a federal-state context has been
substantially achieved in those cases in which certification was tried.
B. Certification in State-to-State Situations
The question remaining is what the empirical study indicates about
the potential use of certification in cases in which one state seeks to
apply the law of another. As has been discussed previously, 177 there is
no inherent impediment to the use of certification in such a context. In
fact, when a state court's choice-of-law rules might normally direct the
court to apply the law of another state, certification can discover what
the foreign law is and thus can be a strong and useful disincentive to
the inappropriate application of forum law-i.e., forum bias. In light of
the strongly positive results of the empirical study, certification proba-
bly merits greater use in the federal-state context. Given certification's
potential in state-to-state cases, its non-use between state courts may
be an unfortunate example of a heretofore lost opportunity. Clearly,
however, the current situation need not continue. We can end the pe-
riod of certification's potential whenever we choose and begin to enjoy
its benefits, especially in state-to-state situations.
177. See supra notes 5-7 & 94-139 and accompanying text.
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Appendix A
State Judges
(asterisk indicates those judges who responded to the survey)
Iowa
W.W. Reynoldson (CJ)*
Harvey Uhlenhopp
David Harris*
Mark McCormick*
Arthur A. McGiverin
Jerry L. Larson*
Louis W. Schultz
James H. Carter*
Charles R. Wolle*
Kansas
Alfred G. Schroeder (CJ)*
David Prager*
Robert H. Miller
Richard W. Holmes
Kay McFarland
Harold S. Herd
Tyler C. Lockett*
Kentucky
Robert F. Stephens (CJ)*
Roy N. Vance*
William M. Gant*
J. Calvin Aker
Charles M. Leibson
Donald C. Wintersheimer*
James B. Stephenson
Maryland
Robert C. Murphy (CJ)
Marvin H. Smith*
John C. Eldridge
Harry A. Cole
Lawrence F. Rodowsky*
James F. Couch, Jr.*
John F. McAuliffe*
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Massachusetts
Edward F. Hennessey (CJ)*
Herbert P. Wilkins*
Minnesota
Douglas K. Amdahl (CJ)*
C. Donald Peterson
Lawrence Yetka*
George M. Scott*
Rosalie E. Wahl
John E. Simonett*
Glenn E. Kelley
M. Jeanne Coyne
North Dakota
Ralph J. Erickstad (CJ)*
Gerald W. Vandewalle*
H.F. Gierke III
Herbert L. Meschke*
Beryl J. Levine*
Oklahoma
Robert D. Simms (CJ)*
John B. Doolin*
Ralph B. Hodges
Robert E. Lavender
Rudolph Hargrave*
Marian P. Opala*
Alma D. Wilson
Yvonne Kauger
H. Summers
West Virginia
Richard Neely (CJ)
Thomas B. Miller
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr.
Thomas E. McHugh
William T. Brotherton, Jr.
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Wisconsin
Nathan Heffernan (CJ)
Roland B. Day
Shirley S. Abrahamson
William G. Callow*
Donald W. Steinmetz
Louis J. Ceci
William A. Bablitch
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Appendix B
Federal Judges
(asterisk indicates those judges who responded to the survey)
Iowa
Edward J. McManus*
William C. Stuart*
Harold D. Vietor
William C. Hanson
Donald E. O'Brien*
Kansas
Frank G. Theis
Earl E. O'Connor*
Richard D. Rogers
Dale E. Saffels
Patrick F. Kelly*
Arthur J. Stanley, Jr.
Wesley E. Brown
George Templar
Kentucky
Bernard T. Moynahan, Jr.
Howard D. Hermansdorfer
Eugene E. Silver, Jr.
Scott Reed
William 0. Bertelsman
G. Wix Unthank
Charles M. Allen
Eugene E. Siler, Jr.*
Edward H. Johnstone
Thomas A. Ballantine, Jr.
James F. Gordon
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Maryland
Edward S. Northrop
Frank A. Kaufman*
Alexander Harvey II
James R. Miller
Joseph H. Young*
Herbert F. Murray*
Joseph C. Howard
Shirley B. Jones
Roszel C. Thomsen
R. Dorsey Watkins
Minnesota
Edward J. Devitt
Miles W. Lord
Robert G. Renner*
Donald D. Alsop*
Harry H. MacLaughlin*
Diana E. Murphy*
Earl R. Larson
North Dakota
Paul Benson
Bruce M. Van Sickle*
Ronald N. Davies
Oklahoma
James 0. Ellison
Frederick A. Daugherty
H. Dale Cook*
Luther L. Bohanon*
Frank H. Seay
Luther B. Eubanks
Ralph G. Thompson*
Lee R. West
Stephen S. Chandler, Jr.
West Virginia
Robert E. Maxwell
Charles H. Haden II
Dennis R. Knapp
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
Robert J. Staker
William M. Kidd
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Wisconsin
Barbara B. Crabb
James E. Doyle
John W. Reynolds*
Robert W. Warren
Terence T. Evans
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Appendix C
State Court Responses to Certification Questionnaire
Part I
1. Did you feel that the certified questions were sufficiently clear?
yes (19) no (3)
2. Did you find it necessary to reformulate the question(s) or have the
certifying court reformulate the question(s)?
yes (6) no (15)
3. Was the statement of facts adequate to decide the issue(s)?
yes (22) no (4)
4. Did you (or will you) use the certified opinions as precedent?
yes (23) no (0) uncertain (4)
strongly
1. Certified questions should be allowed
by motion
a. of the court.
b. of the parties.
c. makes no difference.
2. Certified questions should receive
priority status by the receiving court.
3. Certification should only be allowed
when the issue is determinative of the
case.
4. Certification should not be allowed
after a decision on the merits has been
made.
5. Certification should only be allowed
after the case has been appealed in
the certifying court system.
6. State courts are not offended when
another court decides issues of state
law.
strongly
agree agree disagree disagree
3 9 13 2
9 13 5 0
12 10 3 2
5 3 15 6
3 15 6 2
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strongly
agree
7. A litigant who chose, or removed a case
to, the federal courts should not be
allowed to seek certification of
questions.
8. Certification should only be allowed
when a federal constitutional issue
would be avoided by state response.
9. Certification allows the court to resolve
the issues in the case, while respecting
the foreign court's authority.
10. Certification improves federal-state
comity.
11. All states should have the same
certification procedure.
12. Certification improves state-state
comity.
13. Courts should be required to answer
questions certified to them.
14. Certification creates piecemeal
litigation.
15. The delay and expense of certification
make it an impractical procedure for
litigants.
16. Time delays involved in certifying
questions will diminish as the
procedure becomes more regularly
used.
17. Answers to certified questions should
have the same precedential value as
other court opinions.
18. Answers to certified questions should
have the same res judicata effect as
other cases.
19. Answers to certified questions should
have the same stare decisis effect as
other cases.
20. Certification questions seek advisory
opinions.
21. Certified questions are too abstract for
judicial resolution.
agree disa
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strongly
ge disagree
3 3 15 5
0 3 16 7
1 3 19 3
2 9 12 3
9 16 0 2
6 14 2 2
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Part III
1. Strength of foreign court's interest in
the area of the law.
2. If not certified, the forum court would
have to apply the law of the non-
forum state.
3. Closeness of question of state law.
4. Availability of sources to determine
foreign court's law, such as decisions
in related areas.
5. Attractiveness as an alternative to
complete abstention.
6. Question refers to new or previously
unconstrued state statute.
7. Concern about forum shopping.
8. Avoiding inconsistency with later
foreign court decisions.
9. Identity of certifying or answering
court.
10. Experience with the usefulness of
certification.
11. Extent of delay of disposition with
certification.
12. Other.
Part IV
Do you feel that the advantages
disadvantages?
great some little not
weight weight weight applicable
10 6 7 1
4 11 4 5
9 9 5 1
3 10 7 4
3 8 8 4
15 5 2 2
3 9 10 3
9 8 4 4
4 9 9 2
6 8 8 3
1 7 11 5
2 1 0 0
of certification outweigh its
MCCORMICK: "It is no advantage to us as answering court, but I have en-
joyed working on the questions. They are usually, although not always, sub-
stantial, interesting, and close."
HARRIS: "Greatly. It is relatively new, in one sense. Litigants had a de
facto method previously, but never used it. A statute adopted 5 to 10 years ago
has greatly expanded its use by federal courts in Iowa. It has worked very
well."
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CARTER: "All the advantages are to the court doing the certifying. There
are no advantages to the answering court, yet that court must risk unantici-
pated consequences from deciding an abstract question."
WOLLE: "Yes. In appropriate cases, advantages clearly outweigh
disadvantages."
Kansas
LocKETT: "Yes-since the federal courts have [impaired?] a minimum
amount on each member of class, in a class action, for federal jurisdiction, cer-
tification is important for state courts."
Kentucky
WINTERSHEIMER: "No. Our experience has been that only advisory opinions
have been rendered."
VANCE: "I do not believe the advantages outweigh the disadvantages."
Maryland
RODOWSKY: "Yes-federal courts, in diversity cases particularly, should
not have to guess in the first instance on the answer to a question of state law
which is unsettled."
SMITH: "I have been on the Court during the entire period that the statute
relative to certified questions has been in effect. My own view is that the sys-
tem has worked well."
Massachusetts
WILKINS: "Yes. The system can be abused. There are times when the facts
are important and not certified (or perhaps even found). We have had some
where the certification came too early in the case."
Minnesota
ScoTT: "Yes. Prevents later inconsistencies in the legal community be-
tween state and federal holdings."
SIMoNETT: "Used in proper instances, yes."
North Dakota
ERICKSTAD: "Yes, under appropriate circumstances."
VANDEWALLE: "We have a certification process within our jurisdiction
which is more of a problem than certification from without the system."
Oklahoma
DOOLIN: "Yes-definitely."
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Appendix D
Federal Court Responses to Certification Questionnaire
Part I
1. At what stage was certification invoked?
before
briefed
(1)
before
argued
(4)
after
argued
(7)
2. Who moved for certification?
parties
(5)
court
(6)
3. Why was the certification advanced and granted?
issue(s) of
first
impression
(16)
respect
for the
foreign court
(3)
4. Was it difficult to determine if the issue was controlled by case
precedent in the foreign court?
difficult
(5)
not
difficult
(7)
5. When drafting the certified question(s), who formulated the statement of
facts?
court
(8)
both
(7)
6. Relative to other cases, did the certified questions delay the final
decision substantially longer than would otherwise have been the case?
it was about
the same
(5)
it was
faster
(4)
7. If the state answer did not completely resolve the case(s), what was the
effect of the state answer on the remaining issues?
remaining issues
were made more
complicated
(0)
remaining issues
were made more
simple
(5)
remaining issues
were unaffected
(2)
state answer
resolved case
(8)
8. If the certification procedure were not available, would you have
abstained from deciding the case?
yes no uncertain
(0) (17) (0)
after
disposition
(4)
competing
lines of
authority
(1)
mutual
decision
(6)
very
difficult
(4)
parties
(4)
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Part II
strongly
agree
1. Certified questions should be
allowed by motion
a. of the court.
b. of the parties.
c. makes no difference.
2. Certified questions should receive
priority status by the receiving
court.
3. Certification should only be allowed
when the issue is determinative of
the case.
4. Certification should not be allowed
after a decision on the merits has
been made.
5. Certification should only be allowed
after the case has been appealed
in the certifying court system.
6. State courts are not offended when
another court decides issues of
state law.
7. A litigant who chose, or removed a
case to, the federal courts should
not be allowed to seek certification
of questions.
8. Certification should only be allowed
when a federal constitutional issue
would be avoided by state
response.
9. Certification allows the court to
resolve the issues in the case,
while respecting the foreign court's
authority.
10. Certification improves federal-state
comity.
11. All states should have the same
certification procedure.
12. Certification improves state-state
comity.
agree disagree
8 6 3
strongly
disagree
7
8
4
0
2 7 8 1
4 4 6 3
1 0 3 14
1 7 7 2
1 1 8 8
0 0 5 13
9 9 0 0
10 7 0 1
3 7 5 3
4 8 1
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strongly
agree agree disagree
13. Courts should be required to
answer questions certified to them.
14. Certification creates piecemeal
litigation.
15. The delay and expense of
certification make it an
impractical procedure for litigants.
16. Time delays involved in certifying
questions will diminish as the
procedure becomes more regularly
used.
17. Answers to certified questions
should have the same precedential
value as other court opinions.
18. Answers to certified questions
should have the same res judicata
effect as other cases.
19. Answers to certified questions
should have the same stare decisis
effect as other cases.
20. Certification questions seek
advisory opinions.
21. Certified questions are too abstract
for judicial resolution.
1 3 10
1 2 10
1 0 11
3 8 4
10 8 0
8 10 0
8 10 0
0 5 5
0 0 6 12
Part III
great
weigh
some little not
weight weight applicable
1. Strength of foreign court's interest in
the area of the law.
2. If not certified, the forum court would
have to apply the law of the non-
forum state.
3. Closeness of question of state law.
4. Availability of sources to determine
foreign court's law, such as decisions
in related areas.
5. Attractiveness as an alternative to
complete abstention.
8 6 2 1
4 4 5 3
10 6 1 0
6 6 3 2
2 5 7 3
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great some little not
weight weight weight applicable
6. Question refers to new or previously
unconstrued state statute.
7. Concern about forum shopping.
8. Avoiding inconsistency with later
foreign court decisions.
9. Identity of certifying or answering
court.
10. Experience with the usefulness of
certification.
11. Extent of delay of disposition with
certification.
12. Other.
Part IV
Do you feel that the advantages
disadvantages?
Iowa
8 7 2 1
3 4 6 4
6 10 0 1
2 7 5 4
0 0 0 0
of certification outweigh its
STUART: "Yes-certification has worked well in Iowa. We have been selec-
tive on the issues certified. I don't think the Iowa Supreme Court feels we have
abused the procedure."
Kansas
KELLY: "Yes. As where the issue is [sic] or unclear by our State Supreme
Ct."
O'CONNOR: "Yes, definitely."
Kentucky
SILER: "Absolutely-I've used it a few times, but I've been pleased with
the results."
Minnesota
MACLAUGHLIN: "Yes-if used carefully and infrequently."
Oklahoma
COOK: "Absolutely-yes!"
Wisconsin
REYNOLDS: "No. It places too heavy a burden on little litigants. It is OK
for institutional litigants that are represented by institutional type law firms."
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